Non-discriminatory donation relief and strategic commitment under political competition

Giovanniello, Monica A.; Perroni, Carlo; Scharf, Kimberley; Slivinski, Al

Abstract

Tax relief for private donations towards the provision of collective goods can protect minorities from majority-driven outcomes in which tax revenues are exclusively used to finance the provision of public goods that are only valued by the majority. In this paper we show that non-discriminatory tax relief for private donations can arise in political equilibrium as a strategic commitment device aimed at creating and supporting political alliances that would not otherwise be able to coalesce.

Citation

Giovanniello, M. A., Perroni, C., Scharf, K., & Slivinski, A. (2019). Non-discriminatory donation relief and strategic commitment under political competition. European Journal of Political Economy, 58, 164-177. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2018.10.002

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Publication Date: 2019-06
• Deposit Date: Oct 29, 2024
• Journal: European Journal of Political Economy
• Print ISSN: 0176-2680
• Electronic ISSN: 1873-5703
• Publisher: Elsevier
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 58
• Pages: 164-177
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2018.10.002
• Keywords: Tax relief, Private donations, Strategic policy commitment
• Public URL: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/41136529
• Publisher URL: https://www-sciencedirect-com.nottingham.idm.oclc.org/science/article/pii/S0176268018301794?via%3Dihub
• Additional Information: This article is maintained by: Elsevier; Article Title: Non-discriminatory donation relief and strategic commitment under political competition; Journal Title: European Journal of Political Economy; CrossRef DOI link to publisher maintained version: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2018.10.002; Content Type: article; Copyright: © 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.