The Value and Significance of Ill-Being

Woodard, Christopher

Abstract

Since Shelly Kagan pointed out the relative neglect of ill-being in philosophical discussions, several philosophers have contributed to an emerging literature on its constituents. In doing so, they have explored possible asymmetries between the constituents of ill-being and the constituents of positive well-being. This paper explores some possible asymmetries that may arise elsewhere in the philosophy of ill-being. In particular, it considers whether there is an asymmetry between the contribution made to prudential value by equal quantities of goods and bads. It then considers a similar question about the contributions made to moral value by equal quantities of ill-being and positive well-being. The paper explores some of the difficulties involved in assessing these questions. It ends by considering broader differences, both practical and theoretical, between the significance of ill-being and of positive well-being.

Citation

Woodard, C. (2022). The Value and Significance of Ill-Being. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, https://doi.org/10.5840/msp202212130

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Nov 7, 2022
• Online Publication Date: Dec 3, 2022
• Publication Date: Dec 3, 2022
• Deposit Date: Nov 9, 2022
• Publicly Available Date: Dec 3, 2022
• Journal: Midwest Studies in Philosophy
• Print ISSN: 0363-6550
• Electronic ISSN: 1475-4975
• Publisher: Wiley
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.5840/msp202212130
• Keywords: ill-being; positive well-being; prudential value; moral value; liberty; care
• Public URL: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/13457744
• Publisher URL: https://www.pdcnet.org/msp/content/msp_2022_0999_12_1_30
• Additional Information: Accepted for a special issue ‘Well-Being and Ill-Being’ edited by Gwen Bradford.