@article { , title = {The Value and Significance of Ill-Being}, abstract = {Since Shelly Kagan pointed out the relative neglect of ill-being in philosophical discussions, several philosophers have contributed to an emerging literature on its constituents. In doing so, they have explored possible asymmetries between the constituents of ill-being and the constituents of positive well-being. This paper explores some possible asymmetries that may arise elsewhere in the philosophy of ill-being. In particular, it considers whether there is an asymmetry between the contribution made to prudential value by equal quantities of goods and bads. It then considers a similar question about the contributions made to moral value by equal quantities of ill-being and positive well-being. The paper explores some of the difficulties involved in assessing these questions. It ends by considering broader differences, both practical and theoretical, between the significance of ill-being and of positive well-being.}, doi = {10.5840/msp202212130}, eissn = {1475-4975}, issn = {0363-6550}, journal = {Midwest Studies in Philosophy}, pages = {1-19}, publicationstatus = {Published}, url = {https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/13457744}, volume = {46}, keyword = {ill-being, positive well-being, prudential value, moral value, liberty, care}, year = {2022}, author = {Woodard, Christopher} }