Outputs (22)

MORAL REALISM, FACE-VALUES AND PRESUMPTIONS (2012)
Journal Article
SINCLAIR, N. (2012). MORAL REALISM, FACE-VALUES AND PRESUMPTIONS. Analytic Philosophy, 53(2), 158-179. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2153-960x.2012.00558.x

Many philosophers argue that the face-value of moral practice provides presumptive support to moral realism. This paper analyses such arguments into three steps. (1) Moral practice has a certain face-value, (2) only realism can vindicate this face va... Read More about MORAL REALISM, FACE-VALUES AND PRESUMPTIONS.

Expressivism and the Value of Truth (2012)
Journal Article
Sinclair, N. (2012). Expressivism and the Value of Truth. Philosophia, 40(4), 877-883. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-012-9372-7

This paper is a reply to Michael Lynch's "Truth, Value and Epistemic Expressivism" in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research for 2009. It argues that Lynch's argument against expressivism fails because of an ambiguity in the employed notion of an '... Read More about Expressivism and the Value of Truth.

Metaethics, teleosemantics and the function of moral judgements (2012)
Journal Article
Sinclair, N. (2012). Metaethics, teleosemantics and the function of moral judgements. Biology and Philosophy, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-012-9316-4

This paper applies the theory of teleosemantics to the issue of moral content. Two versions of teleosemantics are distinguished: input-based and output-based. It is argued that applying either to the case of moral judgements generates the conclusion... Read More about Metaethics, teleosemantics and the function of moral judgements.

Promotionalism, Motivationalism and Reasons to Perform Physically Impossible Actions (2012)
Journal Article
Sinclair, N. (2012). Promotionalism, Motivationalism and Reasons to Perform Physically Impossible Actions. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 15(5), 647-659. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-012-9360-9

In this paper I grant the Humean premise that some reasons for action are grounded in the desires of the agents whose reasons they are. I then consider the question of the relation between the reasons and the desires that ground them. According to pr... Read More about Promotionalism, Motivationalism and Reasons to Perform Physically Impossible Actions.

Expressivist Explanations (2012)
Journal Article
Sinclair, N. (2012). Expressivist Explanations. Journal of Moral Philosophy, 9(2), 147-177. https://doi.org/10.1163/174552412x625745

In this paper I argue that the common practice of employing moral predicates as explaining phrases can be accommodated on an expressivist account of moral practice. This account does not treat moral explanations as in any way second-rate or derivativ... Read More about Expressivist Explanations.

Moral expressivism and sentential negation (2011)
Journal Article
Sinclair, N. (2011). Moral expressivism and sentential negation. Philosophical Studies, 152(3), https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9484-5

This paper advances three necessary conditions on a successful account of sentential negation. First, the ability to explain the constancy of sentential meaning across negated and unnegated contexts (the Fregean Condition). Second, the ability to exp... Read More about Moral expressivism and sentential negation.

The explanationist argument for moral realism (2011)
Journal Article
Sinclair, N. (2011). The explanationist argument for moral realism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 41(1),

In this paper I argue that the explanationist argument in favour of moral realism fails. According to this argument, the ability of putative moral properties to feature in good explanations provides strong evidence for, or entails, the metaphysical c... Read More about The explanationist argument for moral realism.

Free thinking for expressivists (2008)
Journal Article
Sinclair, N. (2008). Free thinking for expressivists. Philosophical Papers, 37(2), https://doi.org/10.1080/05568640809485222

This paper replies to Zangwill’s argument that quasi-realists cannot accommodate the conceptual status of claims of moral mind-independence embedded in ordinary moral thought. I argue that this conceptual status is compatible with an ‘internal readin... Read More about Free thinking for expressivists.

Propositional clothing and belief (2007)
Journal Article
Sinclair, N. (2007). Propositional clothing and belief. Philosophical Quarterly, 57(228), https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.488.x

Moral discourse is propositionally clothed, that is, it exhibits those features – such as the ability of its sentences to intelligibly embed in conditionals and other unasserted contexts – that have been taken by some philosophers to be constitutive... Read More about Propositional clothing and belief.

Expressivism and the practicality of moral convictions (2007)
Journal Article
Sinclair, N. (2007). Expressivism and the practicality of moral convictions. Journal of Value Inquiry, 41(2-4), https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-007-9080-x

Many expressivists have employed a claim about the practicality of morality in support of their view that moral convictions are not purely descriptive mental states. In this paper I argue that all extant arguments of this form fail. I distinguish six... Read More about Expressivism and the practicality of moral convictions.