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Free thinking for expressivists

Sinclair, Neil

Authors

Neil Sinclair neil.sinclair@nottingham.ac.uk



Abstract

This paper replies to Zangwill’s argument that quasi-realists cannot accommodate the conceptual status of claims of moral mind-independence embedded in ordinary moral thought. I argue that this conceptual status is compatible with an ‘internal reading’ of such claims once one recognises the essential co-ordinating role of moral judgement. I also argue that an ‘external reading’ is available for an ‘essentialist’ type of mind-independence claim recently identified by Jenkins.

Journal Article Type Article
Publication Date Jan 1, 2008
Journal Philosophical Papers
Print ISSN 0556-8641
Electronic ISSN 0556-8641
Publisher Taylor & Francis (Routledge)
Peer Reviewed Not Peer Reviewed
Volume 37
Issue 2
APA6 Citation Sinclair, N. (2008). Free thinking for expressivists. Philosophical Papers, 37(2), doi:10.1080/05568640809485222
DOI https://doi.org/10.1080/05568640809485222
Publisher URL http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/rppa20/37/2
Copyright Statement Copyright information regarding this work can be found at the following address: http://eprints.nottingh.../end_user_agreement.pdf
Additional Information This is a preprint of an article whose final and definitive form has been published in the Philosphical Papers © 2008, copyright Taylor & Francis; Philosophical Papers is available online at: http://www.tandfonline....me=37&issue=2&spage=263

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Copyright Statement
Copyright information regarding this work can be found at the following address: http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/end_user_agreement.pdf





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