Free thinking for expressivists

Sinclair, Neil

Abstract

This paper replies to Zangwill’s argument that quasi-realists cannot accommodate the conceptual status of claims of moral mind-independence embedded in ordinary moral thought. I argue that this conceptual status is compatible with an ‘internal reading’ of such claims once one recognises the essential co-ordinating role of moral judgement. I also argue that an ‘external reading’ is available for an ‘essentialist’ type of mind-independence claim recently identified by Jenkins.

Citation

Sinclair, N. (2008). Free thinking for expressivists. Philosophical Papers, 37(2), https://doi.org/10.1080/05568640809485222

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Publication Date: Jan 1, 2008
• Deposit Date: Mar 14, 2012
• Publicly Available Date: Mar 14, 2012
• Journal: Philosophical Papers
• Print ISSN: 0556-8641
• Electronic ISSN: 1996-8523
• Publisher: Routledge
• Peer Reviewed: Not Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 37
• Issue: 2
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/05568640809485222
• Public URL: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1016184
• Publisher URL: http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/rppa20/37/2
• Additional Information: This is a preprint of an article whose final and definitive form has been published in the Philosphical Papers © 2008, copyright Taylor & Francis; Philosophical Papers is available online at: http://www.tandfonline.com/openurl?genre=article&issn=0556-8641&volume=37&issue=2&spage=263