All Outputs (83)

Finance and collusion in oligopolistic markets (2024)
Journal Article
Marjit, S., Mukherjee, A., Xu, X., & Yang, L. (2025). Finance and collusion in oligopolistic markets. North American Journal of Economics and Finance, 76, Article 102351. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.najef.2024.102351

We explore how financial constraints affect the sustainability of product market collusion in a bank-financed oligopoly, where firms operate within an imperfect credit market. Our analysis uncovers a non-monotonic relationship between the sustainabil... Read More about Finance and collusion in oligopolistic markets.

Environmental taxes, offshoring and welfare: The effects of environmental damage and pollution intensity (2024)
Journal Article
Iida, T., & Mukherjee, A. (2025). Environmental taxes, offshoring and welfare: The effects of environmental damage and pollution intensity. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 130, Article 103075. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2024.103075

We analyze the effects of domestic environmental damage and pollution intensity on a monopolist final good producer's incentive for offshoring a critical intermediate good. Contrary to the usual pollution haven hypothesis, we find that a higher domes... Read More about Environmental taxes, offshoring and welfare: The effects of environmental damage and pollution intensity.

Cross Ownership Under Strategic Tax Policy (2024)
Journal Article
Can, G., & Mukherjee, A. (2024). Cross Ownership Under Strategic Tax Policy. The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, https://doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2024-0051

We provide a new reason for the consumer surplus and welfare raising cross ownership. We show that cross ownership reduces the tax rate, and increases consumer surplus and welfare under Cournot and Bertrand competition when the marginal social cost/b... Read More about Cross Ownership Under Strategic Tax Policy.

Strategic trade policy in a vertical structure with cross ownership (2024)
Book Chapter
Mukherjee, A., & Sinha, U. B. (2024). Strategic trade policy in a vertical structure with cross ownership. In S. Marjit, & B. Mandal (Eds.), International Trade, Resource Mobility and Adjustments in a Changing World: Essays in Memory of Ronald W. Jones (315–324). Springer

We consider an economy where the final goods producers use a key input supplied by a foreign monopolist. We show how different types of passive cross ownership affects export tax/subsidy policies in the final goods industry. In this respect, we show... Read More about Strategic trade policy in a vertical structure with cross ownership.

Strategic trade policy in a Cournot oligopoly with convex cost (2024)
Journal Article
Mukherjee, A., & Sinha, U. B. (2024). Strategic trade policy in a Cournot oligopoly with convex cost. Foreign Trade Review, https://doi.org/10.1177/00157325241266040

We provide a simple reason for export tax in a third-country model of strategic trade policy. We show that the optimal policy under Cournot competition could be export tax in the presence of convex production costs. This happens whether or not the im... Read More about Strategic trade policy in a Cournot oligopoly with convex cost.

Bilateral Delegation, Wage Bargaining, and Innovation (2024)
Journal Article
Mukherjee, A., & Saha, B. (2024). Bilateral Delegation, Wage Bargaining, and Innovation. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 180(4), 648-680. https://doi.org/10.1628/jite-2024-0023

A firm undertakes workers’ productivity improving R&D before negotiating wage with the union, where negotiation can take place between their incentivised delegates. Under bilateral delegation profit, R&D and productivity-wage gap all increase, whilst... Read More about Bilateral Delegation, Wage Bargaining, and Innovation.

Product Differentiation, Demand Expansion and the Welfare Effects of Cross Ownership (2024)
Journal Article
Banerjee, S., Mukherjee, A., & Poddar, S. (in press). Product Differentiation, Demand Expansion and the Welfare Effects of Cross Ownership. Canadian Journal of Economics,

We show the effects of cross ownership on product differentiation, consumer surplus and welfare under Cournot and Bertrand competition. Under Cournot competition, cross ownership increases (decreases) product differentiation if demand expansion follo... Read More about Product Differentiation, Demand Expansion and the Welfare Effects of Cross Ownership.

Downstream cross-holdings and divestment incentives under bilateral bargaining (2024)
Journal Article
Mukherjee, A., & Zeng, C. (2024). Downstream cross-holdings and divestment incentives under bilateral bargaining. Economics Letters, 242, Article 111895. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111895

We study the stability of downstream cross-holdings in a bilateral duopoly with firm-specific bargaining. We show that the downstream firms never (partially, completely) divest shares if the upstream firms have significant (medium, low) bargaining po... Read More about Downstream cross-holdings and divestment incentives under bilateral bargaining.

Foreign Direct Investment and Technology Licensing in a Polluting Industry (2024)
Journal Article
Cao, J., & Mukherjee, A. (2024). Foreign Direct Investment and Technology Licensing in a Polluting Industry. Environmental and Resource Economics, 87, 2361-2399. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-024-00886-7

We consider a firm’s incentive for foreign direct investment (FDI) and international technology licensing in a polluting industry. We explain the rationale and the welfare implications of complementarity between FDI and licensing, i.e., the firm’s st... Read More about Foreign Direct Investment and Technology Licensing in a Polluting Industry.

Welfare reducing vertical integration in a bilateral monopoly under Nash bargaining (2024)
Journal Article
Mukherjee, A., & Sinha, U. B. (2024). Welfare reducing vertical integration in a bilateral monopoly under Nash bargaining. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 26(3), Article e12701. https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12701

We consider a bilateral monopoly where a linear input price is determined by Nash bargaining. We show with an increasing marginal cost of input production that vertical integration reduces consumer surplus and welfare compared to bilateral monopoly i... Read More about Welfare reducing vertical integration in a bilateral monopoly under Nash bargaining.

Complementary inputs, outsourcing and vertical integration: Price versus quantity competition (2024)
Journal Article
Mukherjee, A., & Senalp, B. (2024). Complementary inputs, outsourcing and vertical integration: Price versus quantity competition. Manchester School, 92(5), 578-611. https://doi.org/10.1111/manc.12480

We compare the effects of price and quantity competition in an industry with complementary inputs, outsourcing and a vertically integrated firm where vertical integration occurs between a final goods producer and a subset of input suppliers. The prof... Read More about Complementary inputs, outsourcing and vertical integration: Price versus quantity competition.

Pro-competitive merger under R&D revisited (2024)
Journal Article
Mukherjee, A., & Ray, A. (2024). Pro-competitive merger under R&D revisited. Economics Letters, 239, Article 111727. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111727

Mergers may increase process innovation and become pro-competitive compared to non-cooperation if firms cannot observe rivals' R&D investments. Hence, the antitrust authorities may not need to be overly concerned about mergers when R&D investments ar... Read More about Pro-competitive merger under R&D revisited.

Bertrand-Cournot profit reversal in a vertical structure with cross ownership (2024)
Journal Article
Mukherjee, A., Wang, L. F., & Sun, J. (2024). Bertrand-Cournot profit reversal in a vertical structure with cross ownership. Economics Letters, 238, Article 111681. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111681

We provide a new reason for Bertrand-Cournot profit reversal. In a two-tier industry with a profit-maximising input supplier and symmetric final good producers, we show that the profit reversal occurs under passive cross ownership among firms.

Downstream cross-holdings and upstream R&D: A comment (2024)
Journal Article
Jin, Y., Mukherjee, A., & Zeng, C. (2024). Downstream cross-holdings and upstream R&D: A comment. Journal of Industrial Economics, 72(4), 1360-1368. https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12391

According to Hu et al. [Journal of Industrial Economics, 70(3), pp. 775–789], downstream cross-holdings are permissible based on the social welfare standard if the investment technology in the upstream sector is highly inefficient. However, the concl... Read More about Downstream cross-holdings and upstream R&D: A comment.

Cross ownership and merger under technology adoption (2024)
Journal Article
Mukherjee, A. (2024). Cross ownership and merger under technology adoption. Indian Growth and Development Review, 17(2), 224-231. https://doi.org/10.1108/IGDR-10-2023-0162

Purpose: This paper aims to consider the effects of a merger on technology adoption and welfare in the presence of passive cross ownership. Merger increases investments in process technology and may increase welfare. The results are important for ant... Read More about Cross ownership and merger under technology adoption.

Losses from horizontal merger and collusion (2024)
Journal Article
Beladi, H., & Mukherjee, A. (2024). Losses from horizontal merger and collusion. Journal of Economics, 142, 277-289. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-024-00857-y

We show that the implications of a merger on collusion sustainability change significantly from the extant literature if merger is not profitable in the punishment subgame where firms play non-cooperative Cournot-Nash game. Merger either does not aff... Read More about Losses from horizontal merger and collusion.

Privatization and innovation in a vertical structure (2024)
Journal Article
Wu, X., Mukherjee, A., & Zeng, C. (2024). Privatization and innovation in a vertical structure. China Economic Review, 84, Article 102139. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chieco.2024.102139

We investigate how upstream privatization affects downstream R&D investments and social welfare in a vertically-related industry with an upstream monopolistic firm and two downstream firms. One of the downstream firms can undertake R&D investments to... Read More about Privatization and innovation in a vertical structure.

Licensing option to reduce rent extraction by the input supplier (2024)
Journal Article
Kao, K., & Mukherjee, A. (2024). Licensing option to reduce rent extraction by the input supplier. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 26(1), Article e12682. https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12682

It is well known that if the final goods producers adopt new technologies, the input suppliers with market power can extract more rent from the final goods producers by increasing the input prices. Higher rent extraction by the input supplier neither... Read More about Licensing option to reduce rent extraction by the input supplier.

Bertrand-Cournot profit reversal under non-commitment process innovation (2024)
Journal Article
Zhang, Q., Wang, L. F., & Mukherjee, A. (2024). Bertrand-Cournot profit reversal under non-commitment process innovation. Manchester School, 92(4), 371-382. https://doi.org/10.1111/manc.12471

We provide a new reason for Bertrand-Cournot profit reversal. In a symmetric oligopoly, we show that firms get higher profits under Bertrand competition compared to Cournot competition under non-commitment process innovation if the products are suffi... Read More about Bertrand-Cournot profit reversal under non-commitment process innovation.

Welfare reducing licensing by an outside innovator (2024)
Journal Article
Mukherjee, A., & Sinha, U. B. (2024). Welfare reducing licensing by an outside innovator. Economic Theory Bulletin, 12, 17-24. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-023-00259-1

It is commonly believed that licensing of cost reducing technology increases welfare. We show that technology licensing by an outside innovator may reduce welfare when the technology is not useful for all final goods producers. Technology licensing r... Read More about Welfare reducing licensing by an outside innovator.