Xiaoting Wu
Privatization and innovation in a vertical structure
Wu, Xiaoting; Mukherjee, Arijit; Zeng, Chenhang
Authors
Professor ARIJIT MUKHERJEE Arijit.Mukherjee@nottingham.ac.uk
PROFESSOR OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS
Chenhang Zeng
Abstract
We investigate how upstream privatization affects downstream R&D investments and social welfare in a vertically-related industry with an upstream monopolistic firm and two downstream firms. One of the downstream firms can undertake R&D investments to reduce input coefficient. We examine two cases: private upstream monopoly versus public upstream monopoly, and show that the presence of a public upstream firm might reduce the downstream firm's motivation to invest in R&D. Compared to upstream nationalization, upstream privatization could lead to higher consumer surplus and social welfare, especially when the R&D process is significantly efficient. We further extend our analysis in three directions to show the implications of technology spillovers, upstream competition and downstream R&D competition. We show that our main results hold with the presence of technology spillovers, and under a successive Cournot oligopoly involving two upstream firms. When there is downstream R&D competition, upstream privatization always hurts consumers and social welfare. Our study yields valuable insights for privatization policies.
Citation
Wu, X., Mukherjee, A., & Zeng, C. (2024). Privatization and innovation in a vertical structure. China Economic Review, 84, Article 102139. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chieco.2024.102139
Journal Article Type | Article |
---|---|
Acceptance Date | Feb 20, 2024 |
Online Publication Date | Feb 29, 2024 |
Publication Date | 2024-04 |
Deposit Date | Mar 5, 2024 |
Publicly Available Date | Aug 30, 2025 |
Journal | China Economic Review |
Print ISSN | 1043-951X |
Electronic ISSN | 1043-951X |
Publisher | Elsevier |
Peer Reviewed | Peer Reviewed |
Volume | 84 |
Article Number | 102139 |
DOI | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chieco.2024.102139 |
Keywords | Vertical industry; Upstream privatization; Downstream R&D; Welfare |
Public URL | https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/32167958 |
Files
This file is under embargo until Aug 30, 2025 due to copyright restrictions.
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