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Mumford and Anjum on incompatibilism, powers and determinism

Mackie, Penelope

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Authors

Penelope Mackie



Abstract

Mumford and Anjum (2014) present a new argument for the incompatibility of free will and causal determinism. Although their argument depends on the assumption that free will is, or is the exercise of, a causal power, it does not appeal to any special features of this power. Their new argument does, however, depend upon a general thesis of the incompatibility of causal powers with causal determinism. I argue that Mumford and Anjum have provided no justification for this general thesis. As a consequence, their new argument for the incompatibility of free will and causal determinism is unsuccessful.

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Jul 22, 2014
Online Publication Date Sep 5, 2014
Publication Date Oct 1, 2014
Deposit Date Jul 14, 2016
Publicly Available Date Jul 14, 2016
Journal Analysis
Electronic ISSN 1467-8284
Publisher Red de Servicios Profesionales
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 74
Issue 4
DOI https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anu088
Keywords free will, causal powers, compatibilism, determinism, causation
Public URL https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/994300
Publisher URL http://analysis.oxfordjournals.org/content/74/4/593
Additional Information This is an author-produced post-print version of an article published in Analysis. It is the final version of the manuscript accepted for publication, but does not include modifications following copyediting and proof correction. For the published version, see: http://analysis.oxfordjournals.org/content/74/4/593

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