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A carrot and stick approach to agenda-setting

Dahm, Matthias; Glazer, Amihai

Authors

Matthias Dahm matthias.dahm@nottingham.ac.uk

Amihai Glazer aglazer@uci.edu



Abstract

This paper models a legislature in which the same agenda setter serves for two periods, showing how he can exploit a legislature (completely) in the first period by promising future benefits to legislators who support him. In equilibrium, a large majority of legislators vote for the first-period proposal because they thereby maintain the chance of belonging to the minimum winning coalition in the future. Legislators may therefore approve policies by large majorities, or even unanimously, that benefit few, or even none, of them. The results are robust. But institutional arrangements (such as entitlements) can reduce the agenda setter's power by reducing his discretion to reward and punish legislators, and rules (such as sequential voting) can increase a legislator's ability to resist exploitation.

Journal Article Type Article
Publication Date Aug 1, 2015
Journal Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Electronic ISSN 0167-2681
Publisher Elsevier
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 116
APA6 Citation Dahm, M., & Glazer, A. (2015). A carrot and stick approach to agenda-setting. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 116, doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2015.05.012
DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2015.05.012
Keywords legislative bargaining, distributive politics, agenda setting
Publisher URL http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S016726811500147X
Copyright Statement Copyright information regarding this work can be found at the following address: http://eprints.nottingh.../end_user_agreement.pdf

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Copyright Statement
Copyright information regarding this work can be found at the following address: http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/end_user_agreement.pdf





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