Alethic undecidability doesn’t solve the Liar

Jago, Mark

Abstract

Stephen Barker (2014) presents a novel approach to solving semantic paradoxes, including the Liar and its variants and Curry’s paradox. His approach is based around the concept of alethic undecidability. His approach, if successful, renders futile all attempts to assign semantic properties (truth, falsity, gap or glut) to the paradoxical sentences, whilst leaving classical logic fully intact. And, according to Barker, even the T-scheme remains valid, for validity is not undermined by undecidable instances.

Barker’s approach is innovative and worthy of further consideration, particularly by those of us who aim to find a solution without logical revisionism. As it stands, however, the approach is unsuccessful, as I shall demonstrate below.

Citation

Jago, M. (2016). Alethic undecidability doesn’t solve the Liar. Analysis, 76(3), 278-283. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anw033

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Apr 19, 2016
• Online Publication Date: Apr 18, 2016
• Publication Date: Jul 1, 2016
• Deposit Date: Nov 30, 2016
• Publicly Available Date: Nov 30, 2016
• Journal: Analysis
• Electronic ISSN: 2386-3994
• Publisher: Red de Servicios Profesionales
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 76
• Issue: 3
• Pages: 278-283
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anw033
• Public URL: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/976101
• Publisher URL: http://analysis.oxfordjournals.org/content/76/3/278
• Additional Information: This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced version of an article accepted for publication in Analysis following peer review. The version of record Mark Jago "Alethic undecidability doesn’t solve the Liar" Analysis 2016 76: 278-283 is available online at: http://analysis.oxfordjournals.org/content/76/3/278.
• Contract Date: Nov 30, 2016