Skip to main content

Research Repository

Advanced Search

Elicitation of strategies in four variants of a round-robin tournament: the case of Goofspiel

Dror, Moshe; Kendall, G.; Rapoport, Amnon

Elicitation of strategies in four variants of a round-robin tournament: the case of Goofspiel Thumbnail


Authors

Moshe Dror

G. Kendall

Amnon Rapoport



Abstract

Goofspiel is a simple two-person zero-sum game for which there exist no known equilibrium strategies. To gain insight into what constitute winning strategies, we conducted a round-robin tournament in which participants were asked to provide computerized programs for playing the game with or without carryover. Each of these two variants was to be played under two quite different objective functions, namely, maximization of the cumulative number of points won across all opponents (as in Axelrod's tournament), and maximization of the probability of winning any given round. Our results show that there are, indeed, inherent differences in the results with respect to the complexity of the game and its objective function, and that winning strategies exhibit a level of sophistication, depth, and balance that are not captured by present models of adaptive learning.

Citation

Dror, M., Kendall, G., & Rapoport, A. (2016). Elicitation of strategies in four variants of a round-robin tournament: the case of Goofspiel. IEEE Transactions on Computational Intelligence and AI in Games, 8(3), https://doi.org/10.1109/TCIAIG.2014.2377250

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Dec 1, 2014
Online Publication Date Dec 4, 2014
Publication Date Sep 1, 2016
Deposit Date Feb 6, 2018
Publicly Available Date Feb 6, 2018
Journal IEEE Transactions on Computational Intelligence and AI in Games
Print ISSN 1943-068X
Electronic ISSN 1943-0698
Publisher Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 8
Issue 3
DOI https://doi.org/10.1109/TCIAIG.2014.2377250
Keywords Goofspiel, strategy
Public URL https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/974997
Publisher URL http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6975081/
Contract Date Feb 6, 2018

Files






Downloadable Citations