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Dynamic bargaining and stability with veto players

Anesi, Vincent; Duggan, John

Authors

Vincent Anesi vincent.anesi@nottingham.ac.uk

John Duggan Duggan, JohDUGG@UR.Rochester.edu



Abstract

This note examines the structure of stationary bargaining equilibria in the finite framework of Anesi (2010). The main result establishes a tight connection between the set of equilibrium absorbing points and the von Neumann-Morgestern solutions: assuming that players are patient, that the voting rule is oligarchical, and that there is at least one veto player with positive recognition probability, a set of alternatives corresponds to the absorbing points of an equilibrium if and only if it is a von Neumann-Morgenstern solution. We also apply our analysis of ergodic properties of equilibria to the persistent agenda setter environment of Diermeier and Fong (2012). We show that all equilibria are essentially pure, and we extend their characterization of absorbing sets to allow an arbitrary voting rule and by removing the restriction to pure strategy equilibira.

Journal Article Type Article
Publication Date May 1, 2017
Journal Games and Economic Behavior
Print ISSN 0899-8256
Electronic ISSN 0899-8256
Publisher Elsevier
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 103
APA6 Citation Anesi, V., & Duggan, J. (2017). Dynamic bargaining and stability with veto players. Games and Economic Behavior, 103, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.04.010
DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.04.010
Keywords Bargaining; Endogenous status quo; Markov perfect equilibrium; Von Neumann–Morgenstern solution
Publisher URL http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825616300252
Copyright Statement Copyright information regarding this work can be found at the following address: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0

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Copyright Statement
Copyright information regarding this work can be found at the following address: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0





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