Naïve realism and diaphaneity

French, Craig

Abstract

Naïve Realists think that the ordinary mind-independent objects that we perceive are constitutive of the character of experience. Some understand this in terms of the idea that experience is diaphanous: that the conscious character of a perceptual experience is entirely constituted by its objects. My main goal here is to argue that Naïve Realists should reject this, but I’ll also highlight some suggestions as to how Naïve Realism might be developed in a non-diaphanous direction.

Citation

French, C. (2018). Naïve realism and diaphaneity. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 118(2), 149-175. https://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aoy006

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Apr 30, 2018
• Online Publication Date: Jun 9, 2018
• Publication Date: Jul 1, 2018
• Deposit Date: May 31, 2018
• Publicly Available Date: Jun 10, 2020
• Journal: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
• Print ISSN: 0066-7374
• Electronic ISSN: 1467-9264
• Publisher: Oxford University Press
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 118
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 149-175
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aoy006
• Public URL: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/936866
• Publisher URL: https://academic.oup.com/aristotelian/advance-article/doi/10.1093/arisoc/aoy006/5035216
• Additional Information: This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced version of an article accepted for publication in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society following peer review. The version of record is available online at:https://academic.oup.com/aristotelian/advance-article/doi/10.1093/arisoc/aoy006/5035216
• Contract Date: May 31, 2018