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Naïve realism and diaphaneity

French, Craig



Naïve Realists think that the ordinary mind-independent objects that we perceive are constitutive of the character of experience. Some understand this in terms of the idea that experience is diaphanous: that the conscious character of a perceptual experience is entirely constituted by its objects. My main goal here is to argue that Naïve Realists should reject this, but I’ll also highlight some suggestions as to how Naïve Realism might be developed in a non-diaphanous direction.


French, C. (2018). Naïve realism and diaphaneity. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 118(2), 149-175.

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Apr 30, 2018
Online Publication Date Jun 9, 2018
Publication Date Jul 1, 2018
Deposit Date May 31, 2018
Publicly Available Date Jun 10, 2020
Journal Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
Print ISSN 1467-9264
Electronic ISSN 1467-9264
Publisher Oxford University Press
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 118
Issue 2
Pages 149-175
Public URL
Publisher URL
Additional Information This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced version of an article accepted for publication in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society following peer review. The version of record is available online at:


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