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Decentralisation, clientelism and social protection programmes: a study of India’s MGNREGA

Maiorano, Diego; Das, Upasak; Masiero, Silvia

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Authors

Diego Maiorano

Upasak Das

Silvia Masiero



Abstract

Does decentralisation promote clientelism? If yes, through which mechanisms? We answer these questions through an analysis of India’s (and the world’s) largest workfare programme, the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA), in two Indian states: Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh (AP). The two states adopted radically different implementation models: Rajasthan’s decentralised one stands in contrast with Andhra Pradesh’s centralised and bureaucracy-led model. Using a mixed method approach, we find that in both states local implementers have incentives to distribute MGNREGA work in a clientelistic fashion. However, in Rajasthan, these incentives are stronger, because of the decentralised implementation model. Accordingly, our quantitative evidence shows that clientelism is more serious a problem in Rajasthan than in AP.

Citation

Maiorano, D., Das, U., & Masiero, S. (2018). Decentralisation, clientelism and social protection programmes: a study of India’s MGNREGA. Oxford Development Studies, 46(4), 536-549. https://doi.org/10.1080/13600818.2018.1467391

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Mar 6, 2018
Online Publication Date May 2, 2018
Publication Date Oct 2, 2018
Deposit Date May 9, 2018
Publicly Available Date Mar 29, 2024
Journal Oxford Development Studies
Print ISSN 1360-0818
Electronic ISSN 1469-9966
Publisher Routledge
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 46
Issue 4
Pages 536-549
DOI https://doi.org/10.1080/13600818.2018.1467391
Keywords India; MGNREGA; clientelism; incentives; implementation;decentralisation; politics
Public URL https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/930404
Publisher URL https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13600818.2018.1467391

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