Bouwe R. Dijkstra firstname.lastname@example.org
Is emission intensity or output U-shaped in the strictness of environmental policy?
Dijkstra, Bouwe R.; Gil-Moltó, Maria J.
Maria J. Gil-Moltó email@example.com
We show that, in a range of market conditions, an ever stricter environmental policy does not always lead to ever cleaner production methods and ever lower production of polluting goods. We consider an integrated technology, where firms can reduce their emission intensities in a continuous fashion. Analogous to the previous literature we find that firms' emission intensities can be U-shaped in the strictness of policy, but we show that this applies only under low profitability conditions. Under high profitability conditions, output levels are U-shaped in the strictness of the policy. The latter result is new in the literature. In the case where the U-shape arises in emission intensities, the minimum is reached where the marginal abatement cost curves intersect.
|Journal Article Type||Article|
|Journal||Journal of Public Economic Theory|
|Peer Reviewed||Peer Reviewed|
|APA6 Citation||Dijkstra, B. R., & Gil-Moltó, M. J. (in press). Is emission intensity or output U-shaped in the strictness of environmental policy?. Journal of Public Economic Theory, doi:10.1111/jpet.12277|
|Keywords||Abatement; Environmental taxation; Oligopoly; Marginal abatement costs|
|Publisher URL||http://onlinelibrary.wi...AFFD646983D0CCD.f02t03? +|
|Copyright Statement||Copyright information regarding this work can be found at the following address: http://eprints.nottingh.../end_user_agreement.pdf|
|Additional Information||This is the pre-peer reviewed version of the following article: Dijkstra BR, Gil-Moltó MJ. Is emission intensity or output U-shaped in the strictness of environmental policy? Journal of Public Economic Theory. 2017; 00:1–25. https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12277, which has been published in final form at http://onlinelibrary.wi...AFFD646983D0CCD.f02t03? This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving.|
Copyright information regarding this work can be found at the following address: http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/end_user_agreement.pdf