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Pareto-Efficient Solutions for Shared Public Good Provision: Nash Bargaining versus Exchange-Matching-Lindahl

Dijkstra, Bouwe R.; Nentjes, Andries

Authors

Andries Nentjes



Abstract

We compare two cooperation mechanisms for consumer/producers of a public good: the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) and the Exchange-Matching-Lindahl (EML) solution, where each agent specifies her demand for and supply of the public good according to her personal exchange rate. Both mechanisms are Pareto-efficient. EML is equivalent to matching. In our specific model with linear or quadratic benefits and quadratic costs, EML and NBS are equivalent when there are two agents. With more than two agents, the high-benefit/low-cost agents are better off under EML. We also analyze outsourcing, where agent i can pay agent j to produce the amount that agent i promised to contribute. In our specific model, payments from high-cost to low-cost agents (and from high-benefit to low-benefit agents) are (usually) lower in EML than in NBS.

Journal Article Type Article
Publication Date 2020-08
Journal Resource and Energy Economics
Print ISSN 0928-7655
Publisher Elsevier
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 61
Article Number 101179
APA6 Citation Dijkstra, B. R., & Nentjes, A. (2020). Pareto-Efficient Solutions for Shared Public Good Provision: Nash Bargaining versus Exchange-Matching-Lindahl. Resource and Energy Economics, 61, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.reseneeco.2020.101179
DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.reseneeco.2020.101179
Keywords Economics and Econometrics
Publisher URL https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0928765519302404
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