A Note on University Admission Tests: Simple Theory and Empirical Analysis

De Fraja, Gianni; Eleftheriou, Konstantinos; Ioakimidis, Marilou

Abstract

University admission mechanisms are often quite complex. This paper examines one effect of their design on the students' incentives to exert effort in preparation for the test. We adapt a multi-unit all-pay model of auction to draw the conclusion that abler students work harder: this conclusion is in line with the behaviour of a sample of students who apply for admission to the Greek university system with the complex rules newly introduced in 2013.

Citation

De Fraja, G., Eleftheriou, K., & Ioakimidis, M. (2022). A Note on University Admission Tests: Simple Theory and Empirical Analysis. The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 22(3), 623-632. https://doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2021-0173

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: May 22, 2022
• Online Publication Date: Jun 1, 2022
• Publication Date: Jul 1, 2022
• Deposit Date: May 24, 2022
• Publicly Available Date: Jun 2, 2023
• Journal: The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy
• Print ISSN: 1935-1682
• Electronic ISSN: 1935-1682
• Publisher: De Gruyter
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 22
• Issue: 3
• Pages: 623-632
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2021-0173
• Keywords: Greece; Multi-unit all-pay auction; University admission
• Public URL: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/8220321
• Publisher URL: https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/bejeap-2021-0173/html