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Corruption and bicameral reforms

Facchini, Giovanni; Testa, Cecilia


Professor of Political Economy


© 2016, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg. During the last decade unicameral proposals have been put forward in fourteen US states. In this paper we analyze the effects of the proposed constitutional reforms, in a setting where decision making is subject to ‘hard time constraints’, and lawmakers face the opposing interests of a lobby and the electorate. We show that bicameralism might lead to a decline in the lawmakers’ bargaining power vis-a-vis the lobby, thus compromising their accountability to voters. Hence, bicameralism is not a panacea against the abuse of power by elected legislators and the proposed unicameral reforms could be effective in reducing corruption among elected representatives.


Facchini, G., & Testa, C. (2016). Corruption and bicameral reforms. Social Choice and Welfare, 47(2), 387-411.

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date May 13, 2016
Online Publication Date May 27, 2016
Publication Date Aug 1, 2016
Deposit Date Jun 6, 2016
Publicly Available Date Jun 6, 2016
Journal Social Choice and Welfare
Print ISSN 0176-1714
Electronic ISSN 1432-217X
Publisher Springer Verlag
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 47
Issue 2
Pages 387-411
Keywords Bicameralism, corruption, lobbying
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Additional Information The final publication is available at Springer via


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