Corruption and bicameral reforms

Facchini, Giovanni; Testa, Cecilia

Abstract

© 2016, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg. During the last decade unicameral proposals have been put forward in fourteen US states. In this paper we analyze the effects of the proposed constitutional reforms, in a setting where decision making is subject to ‘hard time constraints’, and lawmakers face the opposing interests of a lobby and the electorate. We show that bicameralism might lead to a decline in the lawmakers’ bargaining power vis-a-vis the lobby, thus compromising their accountability to voters. Hence, bicameralism is not a panacea against the abuse of power by elected legislators and the proposed unicameral reforms could be effective in reducing corruption among elected representatives.

Citation

Facchini, G., & Testa, C. (2016). Corruption and bicameral reforms. Social Choice and Welfare, 47(2), 387-411. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-0969-9

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: May 13, 2016
• Online Publication Date: May 27, 2016
• Publication Date: Aug 1, 2016
• Deposit Date: Jun 6, 2016
• Publicly Available Date: Jun 6, 2016
• Journal: Social Choice and Welfare
• Print ISSN: 0176-1714
• Electronic ISSN: 1432-217X
• Publisher: Springer Verlag
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 47
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 387-411
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-0969-9
• Keywords: Bicameralism, corruption, lobbying
• Public URL: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/788343
• Publisher URL: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs00355-016-0969-9
• Related Public URLs: http://www.springer.com/economics/economic+theory/journal/355
• Additional Information: The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-0969-9.