© 2016, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg. During the last decade unicameral proposals have been put forward in fourteen US states. In this paper we analyze the effects of the proposed constitutional reforms, in a setting where decision making is subject to ‘hard time constraints’, and lawmakers face the opposing interests of a lobby and the electorate. We show that bicameralism might lead to a decline in the lawmakers’ bargaining power vis-a-vis the lobby, thus compromising their accountability to voters. Hence, bicameralism is not a panacea against the abuse of power by elected legislators and the proposed unicameral reforms could be effective in reducing corruption among elected representatives.
Facchini, G., & Testa, C. (2016). Corruption and bicameral reforms. Social Choice and Welfare, 47(2), 387-411. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-0969-9