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Norm elicitation in within-subject designs: testing for order effects

D’Adda, Giovanna; Drouvelis, Michalis; Nosenzo, Daniele


Giovanna D’Adda

Michalis Drouvelis

Daniele Nosenzo


We investigate norms of corruption using the norm-elicitation procedure introduced by Krupka and Weber (2013). We use a within-subject design whereby the norms are elicited from the same subjects who are observed making choices in a bribery game. We test whether the order in which the norm-elicitation task and the bribery game are conducted affects elicited norms and behavior. We find little evidence of order effects in our experiment. We discuss how these results compare with those reported in the existing literature.


D’Adda, G., Drouvelis, M., & Nosenzo, D. (2016). Norm elicitation in within-subject designs: testing for order effects. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 62,

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Feb 26, 2016
Online Publication Date Mar 7, 2016
Publication Date Jun 1, 2016
Deposit Date Apr 6, 2016
Publicly Available Date Apr 6, 2016
Journal Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
Print ISSN 2214-8043
Electronic ISSN 2214-8051
Publisher Elsevier
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 62
Keywords Social norms; Norm elicitation; Order effects; Within-subject design; Bribery game
Public URL
Publisher URL


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