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Tullock contests may be revenue superior to auctions in a symmetric setting

Matros, Alexander; Possajennikov, Alex

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Authors

Alexander Matros



Abstract

We consider a symmetric two-player common-value setting where each player gets a private signal about the object value. We show that for some parameter values the equilibrium revenue can be higher in a Tullock contest than in the standard auctions.

Citation

Matros, A., & Possajennikov, A. (2016). Tullock contests may be revenue superior to auctions in a symmetric setting. Economics Letters, 142, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.03.003

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Mar 4, 2016
Online Publication Date Mar 11, 2016
Publication Date May 1, 2016
Deposit Date Mar 24, 2016
Publicly Available Date Mar 24, 2016
Journal Economics Letters
Print ISSN 0165-1765
Electronic ISSN 1873-7374
Publisher Elsevier
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 142
DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.03.003
Public URL https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/782355
Publisher URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.03.003

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