Tullock contests may be revenue superior to auctions in a symmetric setting

Matros, Alexander; Possajennikov, Alex

Abstract

We consider a symmetric two-player common-value setting where each player gets a private signal about the object value. We show that for some parameter values the equilibrium revenue can be higher in a Tullock contest than in the standard auctions.

Citation

Matros, A., & Possajennikov, A. (2016). Tullock contests may be revenue superior to auctions in a symmetric setting. Economics Letters, 142, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.03.003

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Mar 4, 2016
• Online Publication Date: Mar 11, 2016
• Publication Date: May 1, 2016
• Deposit Date: Mar 24, 2016
• Publicly Available Date: Mar 24, 2016
• Journal: Economics Letters
• Print ISSN: 0165-1765
• Electronic ISSN: 0165-1765
• Publisher: Elsevier
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 142
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.03.003
• Public URL: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/782355
• Publisher URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.03.003