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Tullock contests may be revenue superior to auctions in a symmetric setting

Matros, Alexander; Possajennikov, Alex

Authors

Alexander Matros alexander.matros@gmail.com



Abstract

We consider a symmetric two-player common-value setting where each player gets a private signal about the object value. We show that for some parameter values the equilibrium revenue can be higher in a Tullock contest than in the standard auctions.

Journal Article Type Article
Publication Date May 1, 2016
Journal Economics Letters
Print ISSN 0165-1765
Electronic ISSN 0165-1765
Publisher Elsevier
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 142
APA6 Citation Matros, A., & Possajennikov, A. (2016). Tullock contests may be revenue superior to auctions in a symmetric setting. Economics Letters, 142, doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2016.03.003
DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.03.003
Publisher URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.03.003
Copyright Statement Copyright information regarding this work can be found at the following address: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0

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Copyright Statement
Copyright information regarding this work can be found at the following address: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0





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