Reasons, inescapability and persuasion

Sinclair, Neil

Abstract

This paper outlines a new metasemantic theory of moral reason statements, focused on explaining how the reasons thus stated can be inescapable. The motivation for the theory is in part that it can explain this and other phenomena concerning moral reasons. The account also suggests a general recipe for explanations of conceptual features of moral reason statements.

Citation

Sinclair, N. (2016). Reasons, inescapability and persuasion. Philosophical Studies, 173(10), 2823-2844. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0639-x

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Feb 29, 2016
• Publication Date: Feb 29, 2016
• Deposit Date: Mar 2, 2016
• Publicly Available Date: Mar 2, 2016
• Journal: Philosophical Studies
• Print ISSN: 0554-0739
• Electronic ISSN: 2153-8379
• Publisher: Philosophy Documentation Center
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 173
• Issue: 10
• Pages: 2823-2844
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0639-x
• Keywords: expressivism, external reasons, inescapability, moral reasons
• Public URL: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/774800
• Publisher URL: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11098-016-0639-x