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CEO incentive contracts in China: why does city location matter?

Bryson, Alex; Forth, John; Zhou, Minghai

Authors

Alex Bryson a.bryson@niesr.ac.uk

John Forth j.forth@niesr.ac.uk

Minghai Zhou Minghai.Zhou@nottingham.edu.cn



Contributors

Jaime Ortega
Editor

Abstract

CEO incentive contracts are commonplace in China but their incidence varies significantly across Chinese cities. We show that city and provincial policy experiments help explain this variance. We examine the role of two policy experiments: the use of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) to attract foreign direct investment (FDI), and the privatization of state owned enterprises (SOEs). The introduction of SEZs is found to be uncorrelated with the prevalence of CEO incentive contracts. However, firms are more likely to use such contracts in areas that saw rapid SOE privatisation, irrespective of the firm's own current ownership status and irrespective of the size of the SOE sector in the late 1970s. The positive effect of privatisation is robust to various estimation techniques and model specifications. These findings suggest that domestic privatisation policies have been more influential than FDI in driving the expansion of incentive contracts in China.

Publication Date Nov 17, 2014
Publisher Emerald
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Issue 15
Series Title Advances in the economic analysis of participatory and labor-managed firms
Book Title International perspectives on participation
ISBN 9781784411695
APA6 Citation Bryson, A., Forth, J., & Zhou, M. (2014). CEO incentive contracts in China: why does city location matter?. In J. Ortega (Ed.), International perspectives on participation. Emerald. https://doi.org/10.1108/S0885-333920140000015009
DOI https://doi.org/10.1108/S0885-333920140000015009
Keywords Executive compensation, CEOs, Privatisation, FDI, China, Cities
Publisher URL http://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/abs/10.1108/S0885-333920140000015009
Copyright Statement Copyright information regarding this work can be found at the following address: http://eprints.nottingh.../end_user_agreement.pdf

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Copyright Statement
Copyright information regarding this work can be found at the following address: http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/end_user_agreement.pdf





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