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Common reasoning in games: a Lewisian analysis of common knowledge of rationality

Cubitt, Robin P.; Sugden, Robert

Authors

ROBIN CUBITT robin.cubitt@nottingham.ac.uk
Professor of Economics & Decision Research

Robert Sugden r.sugden@uea.ac.uk



Abstract

Abstract: We present a new class of models of players’ reasoning in non-cooperative games, inspired by David Lewis’s account of common knowledge. We argue that the models in this class formalise common knowledge of rationality in a way that is distinctive, in virtue of modelling steps of reasoning; and attractive, in virtue of being able to represent coherently common knowledge of any consistent standard of individual decision-theoretic rationality. We contrast our approach with that of Robert Aumann (1987), arguing that the former avoids and diagnoses certain paradoxes to which the latter may give rise when extended in particular ways.

Journal Article Type Article
Publication Date Nov 1, 2014
Journal Economics and Philosophy
Print ISSN 0266-2671
Electronic ISSN 0266-2671
Publisher Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 30
Issue 3
APA6 Citation Cubitt, R. P., & Sugden, R. (2014). Common reasoning in games: a Lewisian analysis of common knowledge of rationality. Economics and Philosophy, 30(3), doi:10.1017/S0266267114000339
DOI https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267114000339
Publisher URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0266267114000339
Copyright Statement Copyright information regarding this work can be found at the following address: http://eprints.nottingh.../end_user_agreement.pdf
Additional Information Copyright Cambridge University Press.

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Copyright Statement
Copyright information regarding this work can be found at the following address: http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/end_user_agreement.pdf





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