Common reasoning in games: a Lewisian analysis of common knowledge of rationality

Cubitt, Robin P.; Sugden, Robert

Abstract

Abstract: We present a new class of models of players’ reasoning in non-cooperative games, inspired by David Lewis’s account of common knowledge. We argue that the models in this class formalise common knowledge of rationality in a way that is distinctive, in virtue of modelling steps of reasoning; and attractive, in virtue of being able to represent coherently common knowledge of any consistent standard of individual decision-theoretic rationality. We contrast our approach with that of Robert Aumann (1987), arguing that the former avoids and diagnoses certain paradoxes to which the latter may give rise when extended in particular ways.

Citation

Cubitt, R. P., & Sugden, R. (2014). Common reasoning in games: a Lewisian analysis of common knowledge of rationality. Economics and Philosophy, 30(3), https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267114000339

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Publication Date: Nov 1, 2014
• Deposit Date: Dec 7, 2014
• Publicly Available Date: Dec 7, 2014
• Journal: Economics and Philosophy
• Print ISSN: 0266-2671
• Electronic ISSN: 0266-2671
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 30
• Issue: 3
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267114000339
• Public URL: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/737233
• Publisher URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0266267114000339
• Additional Information: Copyright Cambridge University Press.