Causal theories of explanation and the challenge of explanatory disagreement

Jansson, Lina

Abstract

When evaluating the success of causal theories of explanation the focus has typically been on the legitimacy of causal relations and on putative examples of explanations that we cannot capture in causal terms. Here I motivate the existence of a third kind of problem: the difficulty of accounting for explanatory disputes. Moreover, I argue that this problem remains even if the first two are settled and that it threatens to undercut one of the central motivations for causal accounts of explanation, namely, the causal account of the directionality of scientific explanation.

Citation

Jansson, L. (2014). Causal theories of explanation and the challenge of explanatory disagreement. Philosophy of Science, 81(3), https://doi.org/10.1086/676687

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Jan 1, 2014
• Publication Date: Jul 1, 2014
• Deposit Date: Jul 12, 2016
• Publicly Available Date: Jul 12, 2016
• Journal: Philosophy of Science
• Print ISSN: 0031-8248
• Electronic ISSN: 1539-767X
• Publisher: University of Chicago Press
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 81
• Issue: 3
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1086/676687
• Public URL: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/729641
• Publisher URL: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/676687
• Additional Information: © 2014 by the Philosophy of Science Association. Accepted for publication by Philosophy of Science on 01/01/2014
• Contract Date: Jul 12, 2016