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Causal theories of explanation and the challenge of explanatory disagreement

Jansson, Lina

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Abstract

When evaluating the success of causal theories of explanation the focus has typically been on the legitimacy of causal relations and on putative examples of explanations that we cannot capture in causal terms. Here I motivate the existence of a third kind of problem: the difficulty of accounting for explanatory disputes. Moreover, I argue that this problem remains even if the first two are settled and that it threatens to undercut one of the central motivations for causal accounts of explanation, namely, the causal account of the directionality of scientific explanation.

Citation

Jansson, L. (2014). Causal theories of explanation and the challenge of explanatory disagreement. Philosophy of Science, 81(3), https://doi.org/10.1086/676687

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Jan 1, 2014
Publication Date Jul 1, 2014
Deposit Date Jul 12, 2016
Publicly Available Date Jul 12, 2016
Journal Philosophy of Science
Print ISSN 0031-8248
Electronic ISSN 1539-767X
Publisher University of Chicago Press
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 81
Issue 3
DOI https://doi.org/10.1086/676687
Public URL http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/id/eprint/34880
Publisher URL http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/676687
Copyright Statement Copyright information regarding this work can be found at the following address: http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/end_user_agreement.pdf
Additional Information © 2014 by the Philosophy of Science Association. Accepted for publication by Philosophy of Science on 01/01/2014

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Copyright Statement
Copyright information regarding this work can be found at the following address: http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/end_user_agreement.pdf





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