Explanatory asymmetries, ground, and ontological dependence

Jansson, Lina

Abstract

The notions of ground and ontological dependence have made a prominent resurgence in much of contemporary metaphysics. However, objections have been raised. On the one hand, objections have been raised to the need for distinctively metaphysical notions of ground and ontological dependence. On the other, objections have been raised to the usefulness of adding ground and ontological dependence to the existing store of other metaphysical notions. Even the logical properties of ground and ontological dependence are under debate. In this article, I focus on how to account for the judgements of non-symmetry in several of the cases that motivate the introduction of notions like ground and ontological dependence. By focusing on the notion of explanation relative to a theory, I conclude that we do not need to postulate a distinctively asymmetric metaphysical notion in order to account for these judgements.

Citation

Jansson, L. (in press). Explanatory asymmetries, ground, and ontological dependence. Erkenntnis, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-016-9802-1

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Jan 19, 2016
• Online Publication Date: Feb 22, 2016
• Deposit Date: Jul 12, 2016
• Publicly Available Date: Jul 12, 2016
• Journal: Erkenntnis
• Print ISSN: 0165-0106
• Electronic ISSN: 1572-8420
• Publisher: Springer Verlag
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-016-9802-1
• Public URL: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/775561
• Publisher URL: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10670-016-9802-1
• Additional Information: The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-016-9802-1
• Contract Date: Jul 12, 2016