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The Scandal of Deduction and Aristotle’s Method for Discovering Syllogisms

Duncombe, Matthew

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Abstract

(1) If a deductive argument is valid, then the conclusion is not novel. (2) If the conclusion of an argument is not novel, the argument is not useful. So, (3) if a deductive argument is valid, it is not useful. This conclusion, (3), is unacceptable. Since the argument is valid, we must reject at least one premise. So, should we reject (1) or (2)? This puzzle is usually known as the 'scandal of deduction'. Analytic philosophers have tried to reject (1) but have assumed premise (2). I argue here that Aristotle would deny (2). Aristotle thinks that at least some deductive arguments are useful, even though they present no new conclusions. Thus, Aristotle's view contrasts with analytic philosophers of logic, who assume that all useful deductive arguments present novel conclusions. I don't claim that Aristotle 'solves' the problem: it was never posed in Aristotle's time. Rather, I suggest that Aristotle does not face the problem because he assumes deductions can be useful, without presenting novel conclusions. Aristotle's view of deduction tames the scandal.

Citation

Duncombe, M. (2021). The Scandal of Deduction and Aristotle’s Method for Discovering Syllogisms. Rhizomata, 8(2), 289-311. https://doi.org/10.1515/rhiz-2020-0013

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Feb 19, 2021
Online Publication Date May 8, 2021
Publication Date Apr 6, 2021
Deposit Date Nov 3, 2021
Publicly Available Date Apr 7, 2022
Journal Rhizomata
Print ISSN 2196-5102
Electronic ISSN 2196-5110
Publisher De Gruyter
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 8
Issue 2
Pages 289-311
DOI https://doi.org/10.1515/rhiz-2020-0013
Keywords History and Philosophy of Science; Philosophy
Public URL https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/6012743
Publisher URL https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/rhiz-2020-0013/html

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