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REFLECTIVE EPISTEMOLOGICAL DISJUNCTIVISM

Cunningham, J.J.

Authors



Abstract

It is now common to distinguish Metaphysical from Epistemological Disjunctivism. It is equally common to suggest that it is at least not obvious that the latter requires a commitment to the former: at the very least, a suitable bridge principle will need to be identified which takes one from the former to the latter. This paper identifies a plausible-looking bridge principle that takes one from the version of Epistemological Disjunctivism defended by John McDowell and Duncan Pritchard, which I label Reflective Epistemological Disjunctivism or (RED), to Metaphysical Disjunctivism. Moreover, it identifies a modification the proponent of (RED) could, and should, make to the Internalist component of their theory, and argues that the commitment to Metaphysical Disjunctivism remains, even if such a modification is made. The upshot is that the commitment to Metaphysical Disjunctivism on the part of (RED) is shown to be particularly robust.

Citation

Cunningham, J. (2016). REFLECTIVE EPISTEMOLOGICAL DISJUNCTIVISM. Episteme, 13(1), 111-132. https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2015.62

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Oct 12, 2015
Online Publication Date Feb 9, 2016
Publication Date 2016-03
Deposit Date Aug 19, 2021
Journal Episteme
Print ISSN 1742-3600
Electronic ISSN 1750-0117
Publisher Cambridge University Press
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 13
Issue 1
Pages 111-132
DOI https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2015.62
Keywords Philosophy
Public URL https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/5884360
Publisher URL https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/reflective-epistemological-disjunctivism/253508E206AEC6F635E817D0722A8794
Additional Information License: Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016 


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