Dr JOE CUNNINGHAM Joe.Cunningham@nottingham.ac.uk
Assistant Professor
REFLECTIVE EPISTEMOLOGICAL DISJUNCTIVISM
Cunningham, J.J.
Authors
Abstract
It is now common to distinguish Metaphysical from Epistemological Disjunctivism. It is equally common to suggest that it is at least not obvious that the latter requires a commitment to the former: at the very least, a suitable bridge principle will need to be identified which takes one from the former to the latter. This paper identifies a plausible-looking bridge principle that takes one from the version of Epistemological Disjunctivism defended by John McDowell and Duncan Pritchard, which I label Reflective Epistemological Disjunctivism or (RED), to Metaphysical Disjunctivism. Moreover, it identifies a modification the proponent of (RED) could, and should, make to the Internalist component of their theory, and argues that the commitment to Metaphysical Disjunctivism remains, even if such a modification is made. The upshot is that the commitment to Metaphysical Disjunctivism on the part of (RED) is shown to be particularly robust.
Citation
Cunningham, J. (2016). REFLECTIVE EPISTEMOLOGICAL DISJUNCTIVISM. Episteme, 13(1), 111-132. https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2015.62
Journal Article Type | Article |
---|---|
Acceptance Date | Oct 12, 2015 |
Online Publication Date | Feb 9, 2016 |
Publication Date | 2016-03 |
Deposit Date | Aug 19, 2021 |
Journal | Episteme |
Print ISSN | 1742-3600 |
Electronic ISSN | 1750-0117 |
Publisher | Cambridge University Press |
Peer Reviewed | Peer Reviewed |
Volume | 13 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 111-132 |
DOI | https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2015.62 |
Keywords | Philosophy |
Public URL | https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/5884360 |
Publisher URL | https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/reflective-epistemological-disjunctivism/253508E206AEC6F635E817D0722A8794 |
Additional Information | License: Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016 |
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