JOE CUNNINGHAM Joe.Cunningham@nottingham.ac.uk
Assistant Professor
The Basis of Debasing Scepticism
Cunningham, J. J.
Authors
Abstract
This paper purports to provide a fresh cashing out of Debasing Scepticism: the type of Scepticism put on the map in a recent article by Jonathan Schaffer, with a view to demonstrating that the Debasing Sceptic's argument is not so easily dismissed as many of Schaffer's commentators have thought. After defending the very possibility of the Deception Sceptic's favoured sceptical scenario, I lay out a framework for thinking of the agent's power to hold their beliefs in the light of reasons which I argue has initial plausibility. I then attempt to show that with this framework in tow, the Debasing Sceptic has an argument for their sceptical conclusion available to them which Schaffer's commentators have failed to undermine, and which is independently interesting.
Citation
Cunningham, J. J. (2021). The Basis of Debasing Scepticism. Erkenntnis, 86, 813-833. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-019-00133-2
Journal Article Type | Article |
---|---|
Acceptance Date | May 27, 2019 |
Online Publication Date | Jun 22, 2019 |
Publication Date | 2021-08 |
Deposit Date | Aug 19, 2021 |
Publicly Available Date | Aug 20, 2021 |
Journal | Erkenntnis |
Print ISSN | 0165-0106 |
Electronic ISSN | 1572-8420 |
Publisher | Springer Verlag |
Peer Reviewed | Peer Reviewed |
Volume | 86 |
Pages | 813-833 |
DOI | https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-019-00133-2 |
Keywords | Philosophy |
Public URL | https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/5884218 |
Publisher URL | https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10670-019-00133-2 |
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The Basis of Debasing Scepticism
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Publisher Licence URL
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
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