MARTIN JENSEN Martin.Jensen@nottingham.ac.uk
Chair in Economics
Evolutionary games and matching rules
Jensen, Martin Kaae; Rigos, Alexandros
Authors
Alexandros Rigos
Abstract
This study considers evolutionary games with non-uniformly random matching when interaction occurs in groups of n≥2 individuals using pure strategies from a finite strategy set. In such models, groups with different compositions of individuals generally co-exist and the reproductive success (fitness) of a specific strategy varies with the frequencies of different group types. These frequencies crucially depend on the matching process. For arbitrary matching processes (called matching rules), we study Nash equilibrium and ESS in the associated population game and show that several results that are known to hold for population games under uniform random matching carry through to our setting. In our most novel contribution, we derive results on the efficiency of the Nash equilibria of population games and show that for any (fixed) payoff structure, there always exists some matching rule leading to average fitness maximization. Finally, we provide a series of applications to commonly studied normal-form games.
Citation
Jensen, M. K., & Rigos, A. (2018). Evolutionary games and matching rules. International Journal of Game Theory, 47(3), 707-735. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-018-0630-1
Journal Article Type | Article |
---|---|
Acceptance Date | Apr 5, 2018 |
Online Publication Date | Jun 11, 2018 |
Publication Date | 2018-09 |
Deposit Date | Jun 22, 2020 |
Publicly Available Date | Jun 22, 2020 |
Journal | International Journal of Game Theory |
Print ISSN | 0020-7276 |
Electronic ISSN | 1432-1270 |
Publisher | Springer Verlag |
Peer Reviewed | Peer Reviewed |
Volume | 47 |
Issue | 3 |
Pages | 707-735 |
DOI | https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-018-0630-1 |
Public URL | https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/4701004 |
Publisher URL | https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs00182-018-0630-1 |
Files
Jensen-Rigos2018_Article_EvolutionaryGamesAndMatchingRu
(3.2 Mb)
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Publisher Licence URL
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
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