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Evolutionary games and matching rules

Jensen, Martin Kaae; Rigos, Alexandros

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Authors

Alexandros Rigos



Abstract

This study considers evolutionary games with non-uniformly random matching when interaction occurs in groups of n≥2 individuals using pure strategies from a finite strategy set. In such models, groups with different compositions of individuals generally co-exist and the reproductive success (fitness) of a specific strategy varies with the frequencies of different group types. These frequencies crucially depend on the matching process. For arbitrary matching processes (called matching rules), we study Nash equilibrium and ESS in the associated population game and show that several results that are known to hold for population games under uniform random matching carry through to our setting. In our most novel contribution, we derive results on the efficiency of the Nash equilibria of population games and show that for any (fixed) payoff structure, there always exists some matching rule leading to average fitness maximization. Finally, we provide a series of applications to commonly studied normal-form games.

Citation

Jensen, M. K., & Rigos, A. (2018). Evolutionary games and matching rules. International Journal of Game Theory, 47(3), 707-735. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-018-0630-1

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Apr 5, 2018
Online Publication Date Jun 11, 2018
Publication Date 2018-09
Deposit Date Jun 22, 2020
Publicly Available Date Jun 22, 2020
Journal International Journal of Game Theory
Print ISSN 0020-7276
Electronic ISSN 1432-1270
Publisher Springer Verlag
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 47
Issue 3
Pages 707-735
DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-018-0630-1
Public URL https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/4701004
Publisher URL https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs00182-018-0630-1

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