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Why dignity is a troubling concept for AI ethics

Rueda, Jon; Ausín, Txetxu; Coeckelbergh, Mark; del Valle, Juan Ignacio; Lara, Francisco; Liedo, Belén; Llorca Albareda, Joan; Mertes, Heidi; Ranisch, Robert; Raposo, Vera Lúcia; Stahl, Bernd C.; Vilaça, Murilo; de Miguel, Íñigo

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Authors

Jon Rueda

Txetxu Ausín

Mark Coeckelbergh

Juan Ignacio del Valle

Francisco Lara

Belén Liedo

Joan Llorca Albareda

Heidi Mertes

Robert Ranisch

Vera Lúcia Raposo

Murilo Vilaça

Íñigo de Miguel



Abstract

The concept of dignity is proliferating in ethical, legal, and policy discussions of AI, yet dignity is an elusive concept with multiple philosophical interpretations. The authors argue that the unspecific and uncritical employment of the notion of dignity can be counterproductive for AI ethics.

Citation

Rueda, J., Ausín, T., Coeckelbergh, M., del Valle, J. I., Lara, F., Liedo, B., Llorca Albareda, J., Mertes, H., Ranisch, R., Raposo, V. L., Stahl, B. C., Vilaça, M., & de Miguel, Í. (2025). Why dignity is a troubling concept for AI ethics. Patterns, 6(3), Article 101207. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.patter.2025.101207

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Mar 9, 2025
Online Publication Date Mar 14, 2025
Publication Date Mar 14, 2025
Deposit Date Mar 15, 2025
Publicly Available Date Mar 31, 2025
Journal Patterns
Electronic ISSN 2666-3899
Publisher Cell Press
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 6
Issue 3
Article Number 101207
DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.patter.2025.101207
Public URL https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/46566916
Publisher URL https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2666389925000558?via%3Dihub
Additional Information This article is maintained by: Elsevier; Article Title: Why dignity is a troubling concept for AI ethics; Journal Title: Patterns; CrossRef DOI link to publisher maintained version: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.patter.2025.101207; Content Type: simple-article; Copyright: © 2025 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc.

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