Metaethics and the Nature of Properties

Sinclair, Neil

Abstract

This paper explores connections between theories of morality and theories of properties. It argues that (1) moral realism is in tension with predicate, class and mereological nominalism; (2) moral non-naturalism is incompatible with standard versions of resemblance nominalism, immanent realism and trope theory; and (3) the standard semantic arguments for property realism do not support moral realism. I also raise doubts about trope-theoretic explanations of moral supervenience and argue against one version of the principle that we should accept theories that maintain neutrality.

Citation

Sinclair, N. (2024). Metaethics and the Nature of Properties. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 98(1), 133-152. https://doi.org/10.1093/arisup/akae004

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Jan 16, 2024
• Online Publication Date: Jul 10, 2024
• Publication Date: 2024-07
• Deposit Date: Feb 27, 2024
• Publicly Available Date: Jul 11, 2025
• Journal: Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume
• Print ISSN: 0309-7013
• Electronic ISSN: 1467-8349
• Publisher: Oxford University Press
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 98
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 133-152
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/arisup/akae004
• Public URL: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/31886903
• Publisher URL: https://academic.oup.com/aristoteliansupp/article/98/1/133/7710668