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Macroprudential Policy under Incomplete Information

Rubio, Margarita; Unsal, D. Filiz

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Authors

D. Filiz Unsal



Abstract

In this paper, we use a DSGE model to study the passive and time-varying implementation of macroprudential policy when policy-makers have noisy and lagged data. The model features an economy with two agents; households and entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs are the borrowers in this economy and need capital as collateral to obtain loans. The macroprudential regulator uses the collateral requirement as the policy instrument. In this setup , we compare policy performances of permanently increasing the collateral requirement (passive policy) versus a time-varying (active) policy which responds to credit developments. Results show that with perfect and timely information, an active approach is welfare superior, since it is more e¤ective in providing …nancial stability with no long-run output cost. If the policy-maker is not able to observe the economic conditions perfectly or observe with a lag, a cautious (less aggressive) policy or even a passive approach may be preferred. However, the latter comes at the expense of increasing inequality and a long-run output cost, which could outweigh their macroeconomic and …nancial stability bene…ts.

Citation

Rubio, M., & Unsal, D. F. (2020). Macroprudential Policy under Incomplete Information. European Journal of Finance, 26(7-8), https://doi.org/10.1080/1351847X.2019.1679209

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Oct 8, 2019
Online Publication Date Nov 6, 2019
Publication Date 2020-01
Deposit Date Jul 13, 2020
Publicly Available Date May 7, 2021
Journal European Journal of Finance
Print ISSN 1351-847X
Electronic ISSN 1466-4364
Publisher Taylor & Francis (Routledge)
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 26
Issue 7-8
DOI https://doi.org/10.1080/1351847X.2019.1679209
Keywords Macroprudential policy, incomplete information, collateral requirements, credit, in- equality JEL Classi…cation: E44; E32; G18
Public URL https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/2782061
Publisher URL https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1351847X.2019.1679209?journalCode=rejf20
Additional Information This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in European Journal of Finance on 06 /11/2019, available online: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1351847X.2019.1679209?journalCode=rejf20

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