Two kinds of naturalism in ethics

Sinclair, Neil

Abstract

What are the conditions on a successful naturalistic account of moral properties? In this paper I discuss one such condition: the possibility of moral concepts playing a role in good empirical theories on a par with those of the natural and social sciences. I argue that Peter Railton’s influential account of moral rightness fails to meet this condition, and thus is only viable in the hands of a naturalist who doesn’t insist on it. This conclusion generalises to all versions of naturalism that give a significant role to a dispositional characterisation of moral properties. I also argue, however, that the epistemological and semantic motivations behind naturalism are consistent with a version of naturalism that abandons the condition.

Citation

Sinclair, N. (2006). Two kinds of naturalism in ethics. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 9(4), https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-006-9017-7

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Publication Date: Jan 1, 2006
• Deposit Date: Mar 14, 2012
• Publicly Available Date: Mar 14, 2012
• Journal: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
• Print ISSN: 1386-2820
• Electronic ISSN: 1386-2820
• Publisher: Springer Verlag
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 9
• Issue: 4
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-006-9017-7
• Public URL: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1019524
• Publisher URL: http://www.springerlink.com/content/887678048jm3uwl3/
• Additional Information: The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com