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Two kinds of naturalism in ethics

Sinclair, Neil

Authors

NEIL SINCLAIR neil.sinclair@nottingham.ac.uk
Professor of Philosophy



Abstract

What are the conditions on a successful naturalistic account of moral properties? In this paper I discuss one such condition: the possibility of moral concepts playing a role in good empirical theories on a par with those of the natural and social sciences. I argue that Peter Railton’s influential account of moral rightness fails to meet this condition, and thus is only viable in the hands of a naturalist who doesn’t insist on it. This conclusion generalises to all versions of naturalism that give a significant role to a dispositional characterisation of moral properties. I also argue, however, that the epistemological and semantic motivations behind naturalism are consistent with a version of naturalism that abandons the condition.

Citation

Sinclair, N. (2006). Two kinds of naturalism in ethics. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 9(4), https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-006-9017-7

Journal Article Type Article
Publication Date Jan 1, 2006
Deposit Date Mar 14, 2012
Publicly Available Date Mar 28, 2024
Journal Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
Print ISSN 1386-2820
Electronic ISSN 1386-2820
Publisher Springer Verlag
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 9
Issue 4
DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-006-9017-7
Public URL https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1019524
Publisher URL http://www.springerlink.com/content/887678048jm3uwl3/
Additional Information The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com

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