Commitment in symmetric contests

Possajennikov, Alex

Abstract

The paper proves that in two-player logit form symmetric contests with concave success function, commitment to a
particular strategy does not increase a player's payoff, while in contests with more than two players it does. The paper also provides a contest-like game in which commitment does not increase a player's payoff for any number of players.

Citation

Possajennikov, A. (2009). Commitment in symmetric contests. Economics Bulletin, 29(1),

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Publication Date: Jan 1, 2009
• Deposit Date: Jun 14, 2013
• Publicly Available Date: Jun 14, 2013
• Journal: Economics Bulletin
• Print ISSN: 1545-2921
• Electronic ISSN: 1545-2921
• Publisher: Economics Bulletin
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 29
• Issue: 1
• Public URL: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1014731
• Publisher URL: http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2009/Volume29/EB-09-V29-I1-P39.pdf