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Commitment in symmetric contests

Possajennikov, Alex

Authors



Abstract

The paper proves that in two-player logit form symmetric contests with concave success function, commitment to a
particular strategy does not increase a player's payoff, while in contests with more than two players it does. The paper also provides a contest-like game in which commitment does not increase a player's payoff for any number of players.

Citation

Possajennikov, A. (2009). Commitment in symmetric contests. Economics Bulletin, 29(1),

Journal Article Type Article
Publication Date Jan 1, 2009
Deposit Date Jun 14, 2013
Publicly Available Date Jun 14, 2013
Journal Economics Bulletin
Print ISSN 1545-2921
Electronic ISSN 1545-2921
Publisher Economics Bulletin
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 29
Issue 1
Public URL http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/id/eprint/1999
Publisher URL http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2009/Volume29/EB-09-V29-I1-P39.pdf
Copyright Statement Copyright information regarding this work can be found at the following address: http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/end_user_agreement.pdf

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Copyright Statement
Copyright information regarding this work can be found at the following address: http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/end_user_agreement.pdf





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