Outputs (40)

Hybrid Theories of Well-Being (2019)
Book Chapter
Woodard, C. (2019). Hybrid Theories of Well-Being. In H. LaFollette (Ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee894

Hybrid theories of well-being combine elements of two or more kinds of theory. The most familiar kinds of hybrid combine a subjective requirement (e.g. that a constituent of well-being is enjoyed or desired) with an objective requirement (e.g. that i... Read More about Hybrid Theories of Well-Being.

Subjective Theories of Well-Being (2019)
Book Chapter
Woodard, C. (2019). Subjective Theories of Well-Being. In H. LaFollette (Ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics (1-8). Wiley. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee927

Subjective theories of well-being seek to explain what makes something good for a subject in terms of that subject's psychological states. Two ways of distinguishing subjective and non-subjective theories are explained. The main issue dividing subjec... Read More about Subjective Theories of Well-Being.

The Basis of Debasing Scepticism (2019)
Journal Article
Cunningham, J. J. (2021). The Basis of Debasing Scepticism. Erkenntnis, 86, 813-833. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-019-00133-2

This paper purports to provide a fresh cashing out of Debasing Scepticism: the type of Scepticism put on the map in a recent article by Jonathan Schaffer, with a view to demonstrating that the Debasing Sceptic's argument is not so easily dismissed as... Read More about The Basis of Debasing Scepticism.

Impossible Worlds (2019)
Book
Berto, F., & Jago, M. (2019). Impossible Worlds. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198812791.001.0001

The latter half of the twentieth century witnessed an ‘intensional revolution’, a great collective effort to analyse notions which are absolutely fundamental to our understanding of the world and of ourselves—from meaning and information to knowledge... Read More about Impossible Worlds.

Four Dthats (2019)
Journal Article
Predelli, S. (2021). Four Dthats. Synthese, 198, 2959-2972. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02257-y

The distinction between a merely ‘rigidifying’ dthat and a directly-referential take on dthat-terms is well known, and is explicitly highlighted by Kaplan in Afterthoughts, his 1989 commentary on Demonstratives. What is not equally widely recognized... Read More about Four Dthats.

Against Incapacitative Punishment (2019)
Book Chapter
Hoskins, Z. (2019). Against Incapacitative Punishment. In J. W. de Keijser, J. V. Roberts, & J. Ryberg (Eds.), Predictive Sentencing: Normative and Empirical Perspectives. Bloomsbury Publishing

The Unity of Perception: Content, Consciousness, Evidence, by Susanna Schellenberg (2019)
Journal Article
French, C. (2020). The Unity of Perception: Content, Consciousness, Evidence, by Susanna Schellenberg. Mind, 129(513), 339-349. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzz026

Epistemological disjunctivism and its representational commitments (2019)
Book Chapter
French, C. (2019). Epistemological disjunctivism and its representational commitments. In C. Doyle, J. Milburn, & D. Pritchard (Eds.), New Issues in Epistemological Disjunctivism. Routledge

Presentism and the spans of time (2019)
Journal Article
Tallant, J., & Ingram, D. (2020). Presentism and the spans of time. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 101(1), 200-214. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12590

Beyond Punishment? A Normative Account of the Collateral Legal Consequences of Conviction (2019)
Book
Hoskins, Z. (2019). Beyond Punishment? A Normative Account of the Collateral Legal Consequences of Conviction. Oxford University Press (OUP). https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199389230.001.0001

People convicted of crimes are subject to a criminal sentence, but they also face a host of other restrictive legal measures: Some are denied access to jobs, housing, welfare, the vote, or other goods. Some may be deported, may be subjected to contin... Read More about Beyond Punishment? A Normative Account of the Collateral Legal Consequences of Conviction.