The distinction between a merely ‘rigidifying’ dthat and a directly-referential take on dthat-terms is well known, and is explicitly highlighted by Kaplan in Afterthoughts, his 1989 commentary on Demonstratives. What is not equally widely recognized is that Afterthoughts also oscillates between three different directly referential proposals. This essay discusses the semantic and philosophical implications of these different directly-referential interpretations of ‘dthat’, paying particular attention to (a) the relationships between syntactic and propositional structure, (b) the structure and makeup of contexts in the semantics of indexical languages, (c) the significance of context shifting devices and of so-called operators on character, and (d) the aims and scope of propositional semantics.
|Journal Article Type||Article|
|Publication Date||May 20, 2019|
|Peer Reviewed||Peer Reviewed|
|APA6 Citation||Predelli, S. (2019). Four Dthats. Synthese, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02257-y|
You might also like
Who’s afraid of the predicate theory of names?
Kaplan's three monsters
Determination and uniformity: the problem with speech-act theories of fiction
Russell-names: an introduction to Millian descriptivism