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Outputs (19)

Temporal passage and the ‘no alternate possibilities’ argument (2016)
Journal Article
Tallant, J. (2016). Temporal passage and the ‘no alternate possibilities’ argument. Manuscrito, 39(4), https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045

Dynamic theories of time typically commit to the claim that “time passes”. In this paper I develop a version of the ‘no alternate possibilities’ argument in order to show that time does not pass, but that this is no threat to dynamic theories of time... Read More about Temporal passage and the ‘no alternate possibilities’ argument.

Moral Deliberation and Ad Hominem Fallacies (2016)
Journal Article
Leibowitz, U. D. (2016). Moral Deliberation and Ad Hominem Fallacies. Journal of Moral Philosophy, 13(5), 507-529. https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-46810045

Many of us read Peter Singer’s work on our obligations to those in desperate need with our students. Famously, Singer argues that we have a moral obligation to give a significant portion of our assets to famine relief. If my own experience is not aty... Read More about Moral Deliberation and Ad Hominem Fallacies.

Additional reflections on Putnam, Wright and Brains in Vats (2016)
Journal Article
Noonan, H. W. (2016). Additional reflections on Putnam, Wright and Brains in Vats. Metaphysica, 17(2), https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2016-0016

Putnam’s argument against the sceptical Brain-in-a-Vat hypothesis continues to intrigue. I argue in what follows that the argument refutes a particular kind of sceptic and make a proposal about its more general significance. To appreciate the soundne... Read More about Additional reflections on Putnam, Wright and Brains in Vats.

Found Guilty by Association: In Defence of the Quinean Criterion (2016)
Journal Article
Egerton, K. (2018). Found Guilty by Association: In Defence of the Quinean Criterion. Ratio, 31(1), 37-56. https://doi.org/10.1111/rati.12150

Much recent work in metaontology challenges the so-called ‘Quinean tradition’ in metaphysics. Especially prominently, Amie Thomasson argues for a highly permissive ontology over ontologies which eliminate many entities. I am concerned with disputing... Read More about Found Guilty by Association: In Defence of the Quinean Criterion.

Getting off the Inwagen: A Critique of Quinean Metaontology (2016)
Journal Article
Egerton, K. (2016). Getting off the Inwagen: A Critique of Quinean Metaontology. Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy, 4(6), 23. https://doi.org/10.15173/jhap.v4i6.2962

Much contemporary ontological inquiry takes place within the so-called ‘Quinean tradition’ but, given that some aspects of Quine’s project have been widely abandoned even by those who consider themselves Quineans, it is unclear what this amounts to.... Read More about Getting off the Inwagen: A Critique of Quinean Metaontology.

Teresa of Avila on Theology and Shame (2016)
Journal Article
Loumagne, M. (2018). Teresa of Avila on Theology and Shame. New Blackfriars, 99(1081), 388-402. https://doi.org/10.1111/nbfr.12235

This article examines Teresa of Avila's understanding of the relationship between spiritual dryness, intellectual frustration, and shame. It argues that Teresa presents these experiences as interconnected, as well as spiritually and intellectually va... Read More about Teresa of Avila on Theology and Shame.

A solution to knowledge’s threshold problem (2016)
Journal Article
Hannon, M. (2017). A solution to knowledge’s threshold problem. Philosophical Studies, 174(3), 607-629. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0700-9

This paper is about the ‘threshold problem’ for knowledge, namely, how do we determine what fixes the level of justification required for knowledge in a non-arbitrary way? One popular strategy for solving this problem is impurism, which is the view t... Read More about A solution to knowledge’s threshold problem.

On the connection between normative reasons and the possibility of acting for those reasons (2016)
Journal Article
Sinclair, N. (in press). On the connection between normative reasons and the possibility of acting for those reasons. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 19(5), https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-016-9731-8

According to Bernard Williams, if it is true that A has a normative reason to Φ then it must be possible that A should Φ for that reason. This claim is important both because it restricts the range of reasons which agents can have and because it has... Read More about On the connection between normative reasons and the possibility of acting for those reasons.

Alethic undecidability doesn’t solve the Liar (2016)
Journal Article
Jago, M. (2016). Alethic undecidability doesn’t solve the Liar. Analysis, 76(3), 278-283. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anw033

Stephen Barker (2014) presents a novel approach to solving semantic paradoxes, including the Liar and its variants and Curry’s paradox. His approach is based around the concept of alethic undecidability. His approach, if successful, renders futile al... Read More about Alethic undecidability doesn’t solve the Liar.