Getting off the Inwagen: A Critique of Quinean Metaontology

Egerton, Karl

Abstract

Much contemporary ontological inquiry takes place within the so-called ‘Quinean tradition’ but, given that some aspects of Quine’s project have been widely abandoned even by those who consider themselves Quineans, it is unclear what this amounts to. Fortunately recent work in metaontology has produced two relevant results here: a clearer characterisation of the metaontology uniting the aforementioned Quineans, most notably undertaken by Peter van Inwagen, and a raft of criticisms of that metaontology. In this paper I critique van Inwagen’s Quinean metaontology, finding that certain challenges, supplemented by pressure to reflect more closely Quine’s work, should drive Quineans to adopt a stronger metaontology incorporating more of Quine’s radical views. I conclude that while van Inwagen’s Quineanism is problematic there are prospects for a viable, more wholeheartedly Quinean, metaontology.

Citation

Egerton, K. (2016). Getting off the Inwagen: A Critique of Quinean Metaontology. Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy, 4(6), 23. https://doi.org/10.15173/jhap.v4i6.2962

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Feb 1, 2016
• Online Publication Date: Jul 1, 2016
• Publication Date: Jul 1, 2016
• Deposit Date: Jul 30, 2021
• Publicly Available Date: Jul 30, 2021
• Journal: Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy
• Publisher: New Prairie Press
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 4
• Issue: 6
• Pages: 23
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.15173/jhap.v4i6.2962
• Public URL: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/5483599
• Publisher URL: https://jhaponline.org/jhap/article/view/2962