Outputs (4)

Strategic and natural risk in entrepreneurship: an experimental study (2015)
Journal Article
Morgan, J., Orzen, H., Sefton, M., & Sisak, D. (2016). Strategic and natural risk in entrepreneurship: an experimental study. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 25(2), https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12140

We report on the results of experiments where participants choose between entrepreneurship and an outside option. Entrepreneurs enter a market and then make investment decisions to capture value. Payoffs depend on both strategic risk (i.e. the invest... Read More about Strategic and natural risk in entrepreneurship: an experimental study.

Combining ‘‘real effort’’ with induced effort costs: the ball-catching task (2015)
Journal Article
Gaechter, S., Huang, L., & Sefton, M. (2016). Combining ‘‘real effort’’ with induced effort costs: the ball-catching task. Experimental Economics, 19(4), https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-015-9465-9

We introduce the “ball-catching task”, a novel computerized task, which combines a tangible action (“catching balls”) with induced material cost of effort. The central feature of the ball-catching task is that it allows researchers to manipulate the... Read More about Combining ‘‘real effort’’ with induced effort costs: the ball-catching task.

Risk taking and information aggregation in groups (2015)
Journal Article
Bougheas, S., Nieboer, J., & Sefton, M. (2015). Risk taking and information aggregation in groups. Journal of Economic Psychology, 51, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2015.08.001

We report a controlled laboratory experiment examining risk-taking and information aggregation in groups facing a common risk. The experiment allows us to examine how subjects respond to new information, in the form of both privately observed signals... Read More about Risk taking and information aggregation in groups.

Discretionary sanctions and rewards in the repeated inspection game (2015)
Journal Article
Nosenzo, D., Offerman, T., Sefton, M., & Veen, A. V. D. (in press). Discretionary sanctions and rewards in the repeated inspection game. Management Science, 62(2), https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2014.2124

We experimentally investigate a repeated “inspection game” where, in the stage game, an employee can either work or shirk and an employer simultaneously chooses to inspect or not inspect. The unique equilibrium of the stage game is in mixed strategie... Read More about Discretionary sanctions and rewards in the repeated inspection game.