Skip to main content

Research Repository

Advanced Search

Combining ‘‘real effort’’ with induced effort costs: the ball-catching task

Gaechter, Simon; Huang, Lingbo; Sefton, Martin

Combining ‘‘real effort’’ with induced effort costs: the ball-catching task Thumbnail


Authors

Lingbo Huang



Abstract

We introduce the “ball-catching task”, a novel computerized task, which combines a tangible action (“catching balls”) with induced material cost of effort. The central feature of the ball-catching task is that it allows researchers to manipulate the cost of effort function as well as the production function, which permits quantitative predictions on effort provision. In an experiment with piece-rate incentives we find that the comparative static and the point predictions on effort provision are remarkably accurate. We also present experimental findings from three classic experiments, namely, team production, gift exchange and tournament, using the task. All of the results are closely in line with the stylized facts from experiments using purely induced values. We conclude that the ball-catching task combines the advantages of real effort tasks with the use of induced values, which is useful for theory-testing purposes as well as for applications.

Citation

Gaechter, S., Huang, L., & Sefton, M. (2016). Combining ‘‘real effort’’ with induced effort costs: the ball-catching task. Experimental Economics, 19(4), https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-015-9465-9

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Aug 30, 2015
Online Publication Date Sep 9, 2015
Publication Date Dec 31, 2016
Deposit Date Sep 17, 2015
Publicly Available Date Sep 17, 2015
Journal Experimental Economics
Print ISSN 1386-4157
Electronic ISSN 1573-6938
Publisher Springer Verlag
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 19
Issue 4
DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-015-9465-9
Keywords Real effort task, Piece-rate theory, Team incentives, Gift exchange, Tournaments, Online real effort experiment
Public URL https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/831202
Publisher URL http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10683-015-9465-9
Contract Date Sep 17, 2015

Files





You might also like



Downloadable Citations