Outputs (10)

(In)efficiency in private value bargaining with naive players: Theory and experiment (2023)
Journal Article
Possajennikov, A., & Saran, R. (2023). (In)efficiency in private value bargaining with naive players: Theory and experiment. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 216, 42-61. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2023.10.003

The paper investigates two-player double-auction bargaining with private values in a setting with discrete two-point overlapping distributions of traders' valuations. We characterize parameter settings in which there exists a fully efficient equilibr... Read More about (In)efficiency in private value bargaining with naive players: Theory and experiment.

“Greedy” demand adjustment in cooperative games (2023)
Journal Article
Montero, M., & Possajennikov, A. (2023). “Greedy” demand adjustment in cooperative games. Annals of Operations Research, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-023-05179-8

This paper studies a simple process of demand adjustment in cooperative games. In the process, a randomly chosen player makes the highest possible demand subject to the demands of other coalition members being satisfied. This process converges to the... Read More about “Greedy” demand adjustment in cooperative games.

An Adaptive Model of Demand Adjustment in Weighted Majority Games (2021)
Journal Article
Montero, M., & Possajennikov, A. (2021). An Adaptive Model of Demand Adjustment in Weighted Majority Games. Games, 13(1), Article 5. https://doi.org/10.3390/g13010005

This paper presents a simple adaptive model of demand adjustment in cooperative games and analyzes this model in weighted majority games. In the model, a randomly chosen player sets her demand to the highest possible value subject to the demands of o... Read More about An Adaptive Model of Demand Adjustment in Weighted Majority Games.

Belief formation in a signaling game without common prior: an experiment (2017)
Journal Article
Possajennikov, A. (2018). Belief formation in a signaling game without common prior: an experiment. Theory and Decision, 84(3), 483-505. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-017-9614-z

Using belief elicitation, the paper investigates the process of belief formation and evolution in a signaling game in which a common prior is not induced. Both prior and posterior beliefs of Receivers about Senders' types are elicited, as well as bel... Read More about Belief formation in a signaling game without common prior: an experiment.

Communication, leadership and coordination failure (2017)
Journal Article
Dong, L., Montero, M., & Possajennikov, A. (2018). Communication, leadership and coordination failure. Theory and Decision, 84(4), https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-017-9617-9

We investigate the limits of communication and leadership in avoiding coordination failure in minimum effort games. Our environment is challenging, with low benefits of coordination relative to the effort cost. We consider two leader types: cheap-tal... Read More about Communication, leadership and coordination failure.

Evolution of consistent conjectures in semi-aggregative representation of games, with applications to public good games and contests (2017)
Book Chapter
Possajennikov, A. (2017). Evolution of consistent conjectures in semi-aggregative representation of games, with applications to public good games and contests. In W. Buchholz, & D. Ruebbelke (Eds.), The theory of externalities and public goods: essays in memory of Richard C. Cornes (85-105). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-49442-5_5

In a semi-aggregative representation of a game, the payoff of a player depends on a player's own strategy and on a personalized aggregate of all players' strategies. Suppose that each player has a conjecture about the reaction of the personalized agg... Read More about Evolution of consistent conjectures in semi-aggregative representation of games, with applications to public good games and contests.

Tullock contests may be revenue superior to auctions in a symmetric setting (2016)
Journal Article
Matros, A., & Possajennikov, A. (2016). Tullock contests may be revenue superior to auctions in a symmetric setting. Economics Letters, 142, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.03.003

We consider a symmetric two-player common-value setting where each player gets a private signal about the object value. We show that for some parameter values the equilibrium revenue can be higher in a Tullock contest than in the standard auctions.

Majoritarian Blotto contests with asymmetric battlefields: an experiment on apex games (2015)
Journal Article
Montero, M., Possajennikov, A., Sefton, M., & Turocy, T. L. (2016). Majoritarian Blotto contests with asymmetric battlefields: an experiment on apex games. Economic Theory, 61(1), 55-89. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0902-y

We investigate a version of the classic Colonel Blotto game in which individual battlefields may have different values. Two players allocate a fixed discrete budget across battlefields. Each battlefield is won by the player who allocates the most to... Read More about Majoritarian Blotto contests with asymmetric battlefields: an experiment on apex games.

Conjectural variations in aggregative games: an evolutionary perspective (2015)
Journal Article
Possajennikov, A. (2015). Conjectural variations in aggregative games: an evolutionary perspective. Mathematical Social Sciences, 77, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2015.07.003

Suppose that in symmetric aggregative games, in which payoffs depend only on a player's strategy and on an aggregate of all players' strategies, players have conjectures about the reaction of the aggregate to marginal changes in their strategy. The p... Read More about Conjectural variations in aggregative games: an evolutionary perspective.

Commitment in symmetric contests (2009)
Journal Article
Possajennikov, A. (2009). Commitment in symmetric contests. Economics Bulletin, 29(1),

The paper proves that in two-player logit form symmetric contests with concave success function, commitment to a
particular strategy does not increase a player's payoff, while in contests with more than two players it does. The paper also provides a... Read More about Commitment in symmetric contests.