Lu Dong
Communication, leadership and coordination failure
Dong, Lu; Montero, Maria; Possajennikov, Alex
Authors
MARIA MONTERO MARIA.MONTERO@NOTTINGHAM.AC.UK
Professor of Economics
ALEX POSSAJENNIKOV alex.possajennikov@nottingham.ac.uk
Associate Professor
Abstract
We investigate the limits of communication and leadership in avoiding coordination failure in minimum effort games. Our environment is challenging, with low benefits of coordination relative to the effort cost. We consider two leader types: cheap-talk leader-communicators who suggest an effort level, and first-mover leaders who lead by example. Both types of leadership have some ability to increase effort in groups with no history, but are insufficient in groups with a history of low effort. Using the strategy method for followers’ responses, we attribute the persistence of coordination failure to the presence of followers who do not follow the leader.
Citation
Dong, L., Montero, M., & Possajennikov, A. (2018). Communication, leadership and coordination failure. Theory and Decision, 84(4), https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-017-9617-9
Journal Article Type | Article |
---|---|
Acceptance Date | Jun 3, 2017 |
Online Publication Date | Jun 21, 2017 |
Publication Date | Jun 1, 2018 |
Deposit Date | Jun 19, 2017 |
Publicly Available Date | Jun 21, 2017 |
Journal | Theory and Decision |
Print ISSN | 0040-5833 |
Electronic ISSN | 1573-7187 |
Publisher | Springer Verlag |
Peer Reviewed | Peer Reviewed |
Volume | 84 |
Issue | 4 |
DOI | https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-017-9617-9 |
Keywords | Minimum effort game, Coordination failure, Communication, Leadership |
Public URL | https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/961264 |
Publisher URL | https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11238-017-9617-9 |
Contract Date | Jun 19, 2017 |
Files
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Copyright Statement
Copyright information regarding this work can be found at the following address: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
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