When the Agent Knows Better than the Principal: The Effect of Education and Seniority on European Parliament Rapporteur Assignment: When the agent knows better than the principal
(2013)
Journal Article
Daniel, W. T. (2013). When the Agent Knows Better than the Principal: The Effect of Education and Seniority on European Parliament Rapporteur Assignment: When the agent knows better than the principal. Journal of Common Market Studies, 51(5), 832-848. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12028
This article examines the assignment of legislative rapporteurships to Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). Original data sources are used to test the assumption that committee reports are routinely awarded to MEPs with higher levels of educati... Read More about When the Agent Knows Better than the Principal: The Effect of Education and Seniority on European Parliament Rapporteur Assignment: When the agent knows better than the principal.