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All Outputs (7)

Skepticism: Impractical, therefore implausible (2019)
Journal Article
Hannon, M. (2019). Skepticism: Impractical, therefore implausible. Philosophical Issues, 29(1), 143-158. https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12145

The truth of skepticism would be depressing and impractical. Our beliefs would be groundless, we would know nothing (or almost nothing) about the world around us, and epistemic success would likely be impossible. But do these negative consequences ha... Read More about Skepticism: Impractical, therefore implausible.

Empathetic Understanding and Deliberative Democracy (2019)
Journal Article
Hannon, M. (2020). Empathetic Understanding and Deliberative Democracy. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 101(3), 591-611. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12624

Epistemic democracy is standardly characterized in terms of “aiming at truth”. This presupposes a veritistic conception of epistemic value, according to which truth is the fundamental epistemic goal. I will raise an objection to the standard (veritis... Read More about Empathetic Understanding and Deliberative Democracy.

What's the point of knowledge?: a function-first epistemology (2019)
Book
Hannon, M. (2019). What's the point of knowledge?: a function-first epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190914721.001.0001

This book is about knowledge and its value. At its heart is a straightforward idea: we can answer many interesting and difficult questions in epistemology by reflecting on the role of epistemic evaluation in human life. Michael Hannon calls this appr... Read More about What's the point of knowledge?: a function-first epistemology.

Why purists should be infallibilists (2018)
Journal Article
Hannon, M. (2018). Why purists should be infallibilists. Philosophical Studies, 177, 689-704. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1200-x

© 2018, Springer Nature B.V. Two of the most orthodox ideas in epistemology are fallibilism and purism. According to the fallibilist, one can know that a particular claim is true even though one’s justification for that claim is less than fully concl... Read More about Why purists should be infallibilists.

Intuitions, reflective judgments, and experimental philosophy (2017)
Journal Article
Hannon, M. (2018). Intuitions, reflective judgments, and experimental philosophy. Synthese, 195(9), 4147-4168. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1412-1

Experimental philosophers are often puzzled as to why many armchair philosophers question the philosophical significance of their research. Armchair philosophers, in contrast, are often puzzled as to why experimental philosophers think their work she... Read More about Intuitions, reflective judgments, and experimental philosophy.

A solution to knowledge’s threshold problem (2016)
Journal Article
Hannon, M. (2017). A solution to knowledge’s threshold problem. Philosophical Studies, 174(3), 607-629. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0700-9

This paper is about the ‘threshold problem’ for knowledge, namely, how do we determine what fixes the level of justification required for knowledge in a non-arbitrary way? One popular strategy for solving this problem is impurism, which is the view t... Read More about A solution to knowledge’s threshold problem.