Intuitions, reflective judgments, and experimental philosophy

Hannon, Michael

Abstract

Experimental philosophers are often puzzled as to why many armchair philosophers question the philosophical significance of their research. Armchair philosophers, in contrast, are often puzzled as to why experimental philosophers think their work sheds any light on traditional philosophical problems. I argue there is truth on both sides.

Citation

Hannon, M. (2018). Intuitions, reflective judgments, and experimental philosophy. Synthese, 195(9), 4147-4168. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1412-1

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Apr 20, 2017
• Online Publication Date: May 5, 2017
• Publication Date: 2018-09
• Deposit Date: Sep 9, 2019
• Journal: Synthese
• Print ISSN: 0039-7857
• Electronic ISSN: 1573-0964
• Publisher: Springer Verlag
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 195
• Issue: 9
• Pages: 4147-4168
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1412-1
• Public URL: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/2593909
• Publisher URL: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11229-017-1412-1