All Outputs (5)

Frege, Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob (1848-1925) (2021)
Book Chapter
Noonan, H. (2021). Frege, Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob (1848-1925). In Biographisch-Bibliographisches Kirchenlexikon. Nordhausen, Germany: Verlag Traugott Bautz

Kripke was right even if he was wrong: Sherlock Holmes and the unicorns (2021)
Journal Article
Noonan, H. (2021). Kripke was right even if he was wrong: Sherlock Holmes and the unicorns. Disputatio, 13(60), 51-69. https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2021-0003

In the Addenda to Naming and Necessity (1980), Kripke famously argues that it is false that there could have been unicorns, or more properly, that ‘no counterfactual situation is properly describable as one in which there would have been unicorns.’ H... Read More about Kripke was right even if he was wrong: Sherlock Holmes and the unicorns.

Personal Identity and the Hybrid View: A Middle Way (2021)
Journal Article
Noonan, H. (2021). Personal Identity and the Hybrid View: A Middle Way. Metaphysica, 22(2), 263-283. https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2020-0007

Two of the main contenders in the debate about personal persistence over time are the neo-Lockean psychological continuity view and animalism as defended by Olson and Snowdon. Both are wrong. The position I shall argue for, which I call, following Ol... Read More about Personal Identity and the Hybrid View: A Middle Way.

No Trust is Hybrid: Reply to Faulkner (2021)
Journal Article
Noonan, H. (2021). No Trust is Hybrid: Reply to Faulkner. Philosophia, 49(5), 2189 - 2195. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-021-00341-7

There is a well-developed literature on trust. In his important article Paul Faulkner (2015) distinguishes three-place, two-place and one-place trust predicates. He then argues that our more basic notions of trust are expressed by the one-place and t... Read More about No Trust is Hybrid: Reply to Faulkner.

Critical Note on Williamson: A defence of the Actualism-Possibilism Debate (2021)
Journal Article
Curtis, B. L., & Noonan, H. (2021). Critical Note on Williamson: A defence of the Actualism-Possibilism Debate. Philosophical Forum, 52(1), 91-96. https://doi.org/10.1111/phil.12283

In his book Modal Logic as Metaphysics (2013) Williamson argues that the traditional actualist-possibilist debate should be abandoned as hopelessly unclear and that we should get on with the clearer contingentism-necessitism debate. We think that Wil... Read More about Critical Note on Williamson: A defence of the Actualism-Possibilism Debate.