No Trust is Hybrid: Reply to Faulkner

Noonan, Harold

Abstract

There is a well-developed literature on trust. In his important article Paul Faulkner (2015) distinguishes three-place, two-place and one-place trust predicates. He then argues that our more basic notions of trust are expressed by the one-place and two-place predicates. Three-place trust, contractual trust, is not fundamental. This matters. Having a clear understanding of our concepts of trust is important. The most important assumption of Faulkner's argument is that the notion of trust expressed by the three-place predicate is not attitudinal; it is a 'metaphysical hybrid of attitude and action'. I argue that this is wrong. All three notions are attitudinal and no reason exists to deny that the one-place and two-place notions derive from the three-place one. Once one rejects Faulkner's assumption that the three-place notion can be separated off from the others as a metaphysical hybrid argument for the priority of the one-place and two-place notions collapses. In his important article Paul Faulkner (2015) distinguishes, as is standard, three-place, two-place and one-place trust predicates. He then argues, very much non-standardly, that the basic notions of trust are those expressed by the one-place and two-place predicates. Three-place trust, contractual trust, is not the fundamental form from which the others must be derived. But why does this matter? First, because we need to be clear about our concepts of trust in order to understand our engagement with others since we constantly employ these concepts in describing this. Secondly, because trust has moral significance. We cannot understand the moral implications of our social intercourse without taking it into account. Thirdly, because trust is not just something for philosophers to study (see Faulkner's references). Faulkner's conceptual contention thus matters.

Citation

Noonan, H. (2021). No Trust is Hybrid: Reply to Faulkner. Philosophia, 49(5), 2189 - 2195. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-021-00341-7

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Jan 27, 2021
• Online Publication Date: Feb 12, 2021
• Publication Date: 2021-11
• Deposit Date: Feb 4, 2021
• Publicly Available Date: Feb 13, 2022
• Journal: Philosophia
• Print ISSN: 0048-3893
• Electronic ISSN: 1574-9274
• Publisher: Springer Verlag
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 49
• Issue: 5
• Pages: 2189 - 2195
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-021-00341-7
• Public URL: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/5292274
• Publisher URL: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11406-021-00341-7