All Outputs (12)

On The Myth of Psychotherapy * (2024)
Journal Article

Thomas Szasz famously argued that mental illness is a myth. Less famously, Szasz argued that since mental illness is a myth, so too is psychotherapy. Szasz' claim that mental illness is a myth has been much discussed, but much less attention has been... Read More about On The Myth of Psychotherapy *.

Naive realism, representationalism, and the rationalizing role of visual perception (2020)
Journal Article

Austerity and Illusion (2020)
Journal Article

Many contemporary theorists charge that naïve realists are incapable of accounting for illusions. Various sophisticated proposals have been ventured to meet this charge. Here, we take a different approach and dispute whether the naïve realist owes an... Read More about Austerity and Illusion.

The Unity of Perception: Content, Consciousness, Evidence, by Susanna Schellenberg (2019)
Journal Article

How naive realism can explain both the particularity and the generality of experience (2018)
Journal Article
French, C., & Gomes, A. (2019). How naive realism can explain both the particularity and the generality of experience. Philosophical Quarterly, 69(274), 41–63. https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqy047

Visual experiences seem to exhibit phenomenological particularity: when you look at some object, it–that particular object –looks some way to you. But experiences exhibit generality too: when you look at a distinct but qualitatively identical object,... Read More about How naive realism can explain both the particularity and the generality of experience.

The invalidity of the argument from illusion (2018)
Journal Article
French, C., & Walters, L. (2018). The invalidity of the argument from illusion. American Philosophical Quarterly, 55(4), 357-364

The argument from illusion attempts to establish the bold claim that we are never perceptually aware of ordinary material objects. The argument has rightly received a great deal critical of scrutiny. But here we develop a criticism that, to our knowl... Read More about The invalidity of the argument from illusion.

Naïve realism and diaphaneity (2018)
Journal Article
French, C. (2018). Naïve realism and diaphaneity. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 118(2), 149-175. https://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aoy006

Naïve Realists think that the ordinary mind-independent objects that we perceive are constitutive of the character of experience. Some understand this in terms of the idea that experience is diaphanous: that the conscious character of a perceptual ex... Read More about Naïve realism and diaphaneity.

Bálint's syndrome, object seeing, and spatial perception (2018)
Journal Article
French, C. (in press). Bálint's syndrome, object seeing, and spatial perception. Mind and Language, https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12187

Ordinary cases of object seeing involve the visual perception of space and spatial location. But does seeing an object require such spatial perception? An empirical challenge to the idea that it does comes from reflection upon Bálint's syndrome, for... Read More about Bálint's syndrome, object seeing, and spatial perception.

Idiosyncratic Perception (2015)
Journal Article

Some have argued that we can put pressure on a relational view of experience with reference to the fact that the idiosyncrasies of perceivers can affect the qualitative characters of their experiences. Quassim Cassam calls this the problem of idiosyn... Read More about Idiosyncratic Perception.

On the particularity of experience (2015)
Journal Article

Naive realist perspectives on seeing blurrily (2014)
Journal Article

Naive realists hold that experience is to be understood in terms of an intimate perceptual relation between a subject and aspects of the world, relative to a certain standpoint. Those aspects of the world themselves shape the contours of conscious... Read More about Naive realist perspectives on seeing blurrily.

The formulation of epistemological disjunctivism (2014)
Journal Article
French, C. (2016). The formulation of epistemological disjunctivism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 92(1), 86-104. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12105

I argue that we should question the orthodox way of thinking about epistemological disjunctivism. I suggest that we can formulate epistemological disjunctivism in terms of states of seeing things as opposed to states of seeing that p. Not only does t... Read More about The formulation of epistemological disjunctivism.